Il Young Jeong
Research Professor_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University
As we enter 2025, South Korea faces a grave domestic and international situation. President Yoon Suk-yeol's attempt to impose martial law and incite rebellion at the end of 2024 plunged the nation into shock but ultimately failed due to the united resistance of the people. However, the resulting turmoil has continued into 2025.
Even more shocking is the fact that the rebellious forces attempted to provoke North Korea to justify the imposition of martial law. The government, which should be safeguarding national security and pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula, sought to undermine democracy by exploiting the weakest links of the division system. Reflecting on this series of shocking events, we are once again painfully reminded that peace and democracy on the Korean Peninsula are inseparable.
However, we cannot remain trapped in shock. We must turn this crisis into an opportunity to restore democracy and rebuild peace on the Korean Peninsula.
What Went Wrong?
On December 3, 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law. He claimed, “To defend the Free Republic of Korea from the threat of North Korean communist forces and to eradicate the shameless pro-North, anti-state forces that are plundering our people's freedom and happiness, I hereby declare a state of emergency to protect our liberal constitutional order.” He justified martial law by citing the threat from North Korea and the need to eliminate pro-North, anti-state forces.
However, as investigations into the rebellion’s masterminds progressed, allegations emerged that the rebellious forces had attempted to provoke North Korea to legitimize the martial law. There were even suspicions that martial law troops planned to disguise themselves as North Korean soldiers to carry out social disruption. How could such a plan have been possible?
The government has long monopolized exclusive authority over Korean Peninsula affairs, especially in North Korea and unification policies. No one can engage with North Korea without government oversight, and official inter-Korean talks have been exclusively controlled by the government. Even the National Assembly cannot independently make contact with the North.
Were There No Checks on the Government’s Monopoly? Under the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act, the government is required to establish a Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations every five years and submit annual reports to the National Assembly. However, these reports do not require parliamentary approval, and it was common for the government to present its plans late in the summer or even at the end of the year.
As a result, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, wielding unchecked and exclusive authority, escalated tensions on the Korean Peninsula by advocating for a policy of “peace through strength” and the “Immediate, Strong, and Relentless” approach. It labeled opposing forces as “anti-state groups blindly following communist totalitarianism,” effectively plunging itself into an anti-communist totalitarian mindset.
This approach became more concrete with the appointment of a far-right Minister of Unification in July 2023 and a hardline Minister of National Defense in October 2023. The Ministry of Unification is meant to serve as a safeguard within the government, curbing extreme inter-Korean confrontation and pursuing tension reduction through dialogue. However, it lost its ability to restrain the administration’s reckless actions by merely chanting slogans about North Korean human rights and aggressively promoting the "Unification Doctrine," an overt theory of absorption-based unification that provoked North Korea.
This issue cannot be resolved simply by impeaching President Yoon Suk-yeol and arresting the forces behind the rebellion. Then, what must be done and how should we proceed?
First, Dismantle the Government's Exclusive Authority
Above all, the government's exclusive authority over North Korea and unification policies must be dismantled, and procedural democracy must be reestablished. To achieve this, the roles of the National Assembly and civil society need to be strengthened.
First, parliamentary oversight of various government plans established under laws such as the Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations must be reinforced. At a minimum, the National Assembly should be granted the authority to approve—not just review—the Basic Plan and annual plans for inter-Korean relations. Furthermore, if the government violates these plans during policy implementation, the National Assembly must have mechanisms to hold it accountable. In this process, both the government and the National Assembly should institutionalize consultation with civil society when formulating and evaluating these plans.
Additionally, the government's monopoly on authority over inter-Korean contacts and negotiation representation must be restructured. While this exclusivity may offer efficiency during negotiations, it has also exposed the inability to find new avenues for dialogue when inter-Korean relations deteriorate. Therefore, it is worth considering a system where a separate committee—comprising members recommended by the legislature, judiciary, and executive branches—manages the authority over inter-Korean contacts and negotiations instead of the government alone.
Lastly, to ensure that the Ministry of Unification remains faithful to its core identity of facilitating inter-Korean dialogue, exchange, and cooperation, its responsibilities related to North Korean human rights should be transferred to the National Human Rights Commission and the Ministry of Justice(specifically the North Korean Human Rights Records Center).
Second, Establish a Culture of Dialogue and Compromise
Until now, the South Korean government has pursued North Korea policies without compromising with the opposition. As a result, each change in administration has completely overturned inter-Korean and unification policies, leading to repeated instability in inter-Korean relations.
In a democratic system, changes in government are inevitable. Then, how can we address the disruption and instability in inter-Korean relations caused by these transitions? Under the division system on the Korean Peninsula, conservative and progressive administrations have maintained a significant gap in their North Korea policies. This gap is not only due to differences in policy approaches but also stems from complex connections with domestic politics. Left unresolved, this problem offers no solution.
Ultimately, the ruling government and party must establish a practice of engaging in dialogue with the opposition and, even if it requires some policy concessions, reflecting at least a minimal portion of the opposition's policies. To break the vicious cycle where everything changes with a new administration, the government and ruling party must take the first step in making compromises. Only then can inter-Korean relations be managed stably, even after a change in power.
If this effort to share the government’s exclusive authority with the National Assembly and civil society progresses alongside institutional reforms, the instability in inter-Korean relations can gradually be resolved.
In addition to political discussions, civil society must create platforms for public discourse and lead inclusive debates involving conservatives, progressives, moderates, and religious communities. South Korean civil society has prior experience with this, having successfully developed the National Unification Agreement in 2021 through deliberative discussions among progressives, conservatives, moderates, and religious groups. Unfortunately, these citizen-led discussions on unification were halted when the Yoon Suk-yeol administration pushed its "Unification Doctrine" to the forefront.
In this regard, it is worth considering the introduction of a special advisory position for civil society within the Ministry of Unification to facilitate broader communication with civic groups.
Third, Institutionalize Inter-Korean Relations
Lastly, to manage peace on the Korean Peninsula in a stable manner, inter-Korean relations must be institutionalized. While South Korea's fluctuating North Korea policies have contributed to the instability of inter-Korean relations, this instability is also inherently embedded within the relationship itself.
The instability stems from both Koreas failing to honor their mutual agreements—or rather, because they were not obligated to honor them. What does this mean?
In the 1991 Basic Agreement (Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea), both Koreas agreed that their relationship was not that of two separate nations but a “special relationship formed temporarily in the process toward unification.” This principle is also reflected in South Korea's domestic law, specifically the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act.
By declaring that their relationship was not that of two separate states, both Koreas acknowledged the unique nature of their ties, expressing a commitment to resolve issues of exchange and cooperation as internal national matters. However, this mutual recognition has led to unintended consequences: inter-Korean agreements have been downgraded to promises based on goodwill, similar to "gentlemen's agreements," rather than being recognized as formal treaties.
Since the July 4, 1972 Joint Statement, the two Koreas have signed numerous agreements, totaling 168, including summit agreements. However, without institutional mechanisms to enforce these agreements, they have often been rendered ineffective. This lack of enforcement has been a significant source of mutual distrust. Therefore, both South and North Korea must establish institutional frameworks to ensure the implementation of inter-Korean agreements. If necessary, a formal "Inter-Korean Basic Treaty," similar to the past Basic Treaty between East and West Germany, could be established to serve as a legal foundation.
Given the divided state of the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean agreements may be suspended or become obsolete. However, there must be an effective process to manage these agreements stably and to revise or supplement disputed issues. In this regard, it is essential to create a joint body dedicated to discussing, renegotiating, and overseeing the implementation and suspension of inter-Korean agreements. Additionally, the involvement of a trusted third party—such as international organizations or the EU—could be considered to build trust between the two Koreas.
What Should Be Prepared After Impeachment?
President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law, the military's seizure of the National Assembly and the National Election Commission, and the attempted abductions of key political figures were acts of tyranny that dismantled the very "liberal democracy" he once so fervently claimed to uphold. Currently, President Yoon's impeachment trial is underway at the Constitutional Court. According to a public opinion poll conducted by Research & Research on December 28–29, 2024, 70.4% of respondents answered that the impeachment motion against President Yoon should be upheld.
Now is the time to prepare for the post-impeachment period. If the Constitutional Court upholds the impeachment, another early presidential election will inevitably follow. This election is likely to become a matter of which party's candidate will be elected. However, the critical issue is ensuring that, regardless of who becomes president or which party takes power, no one can ever again exploit the division of the Korean Peninsula to destroy democracy. This is not a problem that can be solved through mere "hopes" placed on a particular candidate or individual.
Discussions must begin immediately on institutionalizing procedural democracy in North Korea and unification policies.
*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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