The COVID-19 Paradox: North Korea does not collapse easily

*The spread of COVID-19 in North Korea is ironically strengthening the state's social control system ⓒiStock

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University

As COVID-19 began to spread around the world in 2020, North Korea closed off its borders and had, until recently, claimed to be Covid-free. However, as the North Korean government discusses the ‘fate of the nation’ in the face of the spread of COVID-19, a sense of impending crisis is palpable both inside and outside the country. It is difficult to determine the exact number of confirmed cases, but, according to North Korea’s official numbers, the cumulative number of fever patients had reached about 1.71 million with 62 deaths as of May 17, 2022.

The spread of COVID-19 is clearly a national crisis. However, the tendency to connect the current North Korean situation with theories about the state’s collapse and to approach and interpret this situation politically is quite worrisome. As some in the media have wondered, will North Korea fail to control the COVID-19 situation and collapse? To this question, my answer is simply, “North Korea doesn't collapse that easily.” Looking at the current COVID-19 crisis, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of the North Korean social control system and how it was made during the Korean War.

 

North Korea’s social control systems: a panopticon created by the Korean War

After the Korean War concluded with an armistice, North Korea established a social control system similar to the ‘panopticon’ proposed by Jeremy Bentham. The panopticon refers to a theoretical surveillance system in which a guard has a one-way view of a group of prisoners, who are in turn divided up horizontally across a latticework of cells. After the war, North Korea has strengthened this social control structure of 'vertical control' and 'horizontal disconnect' across all areas, including politics, the economy, and society.

Three particular features of the Korean War enabled the post-war emergence of North Korea’s unique social control system. First, Kim Il-sung used the war to purge his political opponents and came into power on the strength of his faction. In doing so, he created a centralized, single system of control linking the leader, the party, and the people. Second, from the occupation by UN coalition forces in the early stages of the Korean War led the North Korean authorities to institutionalize a system of mutual monitoring and punishment to control residents of recovered occupied areas. Third, with an armistice agreement, the North Korean authorities were able to continue and maintain the same social controls as in wartime. The war was not over.

The Korean War wiped out the diversity of North Korean politics. And wartime social control systems restricted North Korean citizens’ movement. Additionally, the public distribution system subordinated individuals to the state. North Koreans had no choice but to rely on state provisions and had to obtain a special travel card to leave the city or county where they lived. As a result, North Korean society has been transformed into a panopticon where people have been divided, both physically and socio-politically, by a tightly woven lattice.

 

The emergence of markets and relaxation of ‘horizontal’ controls

But even this impregnable fortress of a panopticon began to weaken in the mid-1990s due to food shortages and the economic crisis. The state could no longer supply everything citizens needed, and in order to survive, North Koreans began to break out of the ‘cells’ dividing up North Korean society. As North Koreans paid bribes to obtain travel permits and ‘cross the boundaries’, methods for transportation and communication across region became more advanced.

No longer able to provide the necessary rations and supplies of the previous public distribution system, the North Korean authorities have so far sought to find ways to coexist with the market. The state sometimes makes attempts to control the market, but it cannot sustain society without the market or the 'Donju' (moneyed class) that have arisen from it. Even ‘Future Scientist Street,’ which soars along the Daedong River and is the pride of the North Korean authorities, is another "socialist fairyland" built by investment from the new, moneyed market class.

However, this does not mean that the control that political leaders and the party exert over North Korean society has weakened. The party's dominance remains firm, but in the realm of production and daily life, the party must maintain a symbiotic relationship with market actors. Yet, the oppressive social control system capable of dividing up North Korean society is still firmly in place and can be re-enforced at any time.

 

COVID-19 is resurrecting the ‘Panopticon’

Recently, certain phenomena have mimicked a ‘return to the past’ for North Korean society, and it is unlikely that these would have occurred if not for the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis is rebuilding the ‘horizontal barriers’ between North Koreans that had been relaxed with the post-famine expansion of the market.

In order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the North Korean authorities ordered "the sealing off of all cities, counties, and provinces across the country" and for people to continue production while “quarantining alongside those in their work unit, production unit, or residence unit." This response is a strategy to prevent the spread of infectious disease by restoring the social control system established following the Korean War.

If the North Korean authorities restore the previous ‘horizontal barriers’ in the panopticon and restrict the movement of residents as they did in the past, the spread of COVID-19 will be controlled to some extent. However, this response will certainly inflict great suffering on the North Korean people and threaten their survival, which is largely based on the market.

 

Humanitarian cooperation is for the good of the North Korean people

Recently, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has stated that if North Korea is responsive, the South Korean government would be willing to negotiate to offer material quarantine support to the North. Upon first glance, this willingness to provide humanitarian assistance should certainly be welcome news. Yet, what if North Korea doesn’t request humanitarian assistance; what then?

Humanitarian aid is not aimed at North Korean authorities. Humanitarian aid is for the sake of the North Korean people, and that should ultimately be the most important goal. In this regard, rather than trying to resolve everything through negotiations between the two governments, the South Korean government should simultaneously work to create a range of cooperative spaces where the government can work together with international institutions and local humanitarian organizations to provide material assistance.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article is a column published in OhmyNews. http://omn.kr/1z03o