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Three Proposals to Break the Denuclearization Stalemate

  

*It is impossible to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula without dialogue between parties. @iStock


Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University


So far, efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula over the past 30 years have failed. However, denuclearization is a necessary prerequisite to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large. In the previous installments of this series, I have discussed the reasons why denuclearization efforts are trapped in a vicious cycle and argued that South Korean nuclear armament would not bring peace to the peninsula.

This final essay in my “Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Series” will seek potential paths for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, I cannot cover all possible measures to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula within the span of a short column. Instead, I will put forth three key ideas drawn from the lessons learned over the past 30 years of denuclearization efforts.

 

The Lessons from Current State of Denuclearization Affairs on the Korean Peninsula

Before we jump in, it is necessary to assess the current state of the peninsula and sort out the lessons we have learned so far. Only once this foundation is set can we clearly identify our goals for denuclearization.

First, North Korea has succeeded in nuclear armament. North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons in spite of the international community’s nonproliferation regime is reprehensible, but we cannot move forward without first recognizing that North Korea is -whether we approve or not - a nuclear power. With North Korea now successfully armed with nuclear weapons, we cannot look to achieve denuclearization through force or by creating a “balance of fear” through a nuclear-armed South Korea (see previous essayAn American Nuclear Expert’s View on Nuclear Weapons in South Korea). We must make North Korea, now on the frontlines of international nonproliferation efforts, give up its nuclear weapons on its own.

Secondly, under the current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons program. This insistence on nuclear weapons is directly tied to the need to guarantee the regime’s safety. It is no easy feat for a nuclear-armed nation to give up nuclear weapons while its security under threat.

In the words of one South Korean Ministry of Unification official, "One of North Korea's reasons for nuclear development or expressing concerns in the process of its nuclear development is the issue of security." This implies that a successful denuclearization plan would “include content that would make it such that North Korean no longer feels that nuclear weapons are necessary.” (Remarks made 07.22.2023) We must understand North Korea's regime security and denuclearization as inseparable issues.

Third, it is highly unlikely we can achieve denuclearization through sanctions alone. The international community has maintained strong economic sanctions against North Korea ever since the country conducted two nuclear tests in 2016. Yet, North Korea has held out for over three years of its self-implemented COVID-19 border shutdowns.

This is a testament to the surprising durability of the North Korean regime. North Korea has already defied expectations of its eventual collapse. The Obama administration's "strategic patience" ultimately wasted the opportune window for denuclearization. We must remember that sanctions against North Korea are only a tool for denuclearization, not a goal in and of themselves. Denuclearization will only make progress through negotiations.

Now, based on this assessment of the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, I would like to propose three new paths forward that differ from our existing denuclearization strategy. This article will not and cannot cover the entire denuclearization process. However, I would like to take this opportunity to step outside of the limits of the existing process and propose the beginnings of a new discussion.

 

1. Normalizing diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea is a must, not a maybe.

During denuclearization discussions over the years, North Korea has consistently stipulated normalization of US-DPRK relations as a condition for denuclearization. North Korea has been weighing the effectiveness of both US-DPRK diplomatic ties and nuclear armament for guaranteeing the regime's safety. North Korea has long understood that only the United States could guarantee its safety and has been eager to establish diplomatic relations. Failing to achieve this goal, North Korea turned nuclear weapons for its security.

For this reason, North Korea has consistently demanded normalization of US-DPRK relations since the 1994 Agreed Framework, throughout the six-party talks, and up through the 2018 US-DPRK summit in Singapore. Unfortunately, the United States has been hesitant to normalize relations. In the end, after the collapse of the 2019 summit in Hanoi, North Korea has set out on its own to single-handedly guarantee its safety through nuclear weapons.

Normalization of US-DPRK relations is an essential task in dismantling the Cold War framework on the Korean Peninsula. While South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China in the process of ending the Cold War in the early 1990s, North Korea failed to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. This incomplete thaw left the Korean Peninsula in a Cold War zone in the post-Cold War era.

Now, the United States is no longer free from North Korea's nuclear threats. The US can no longer afford the luxury of "strategic patience." North Korea is trying to upgrade and miniaturize its nuclear weapons while expanding the range of its ICBMs to include the continental United States. The US should now consider a roadmap for normalizing relations with North Korea, even if only as a matter of its own national security. Moreover, the US needs to take a fresh look at the value of relations with North Korea at a time when the US-China strategic competition is only intensifying.

 

2. Let's involve the EU in denuclearization negotiations.

For the past 30 years, denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula have been conducted in the form of bilateral (ROK-DPRK and US-DPRK) and multilateral (six party) talks. While these kinds of negotiations did produce some results, the lack of mutual trust between parties ultimately rendered these agreements ineffective.

Frankly, even if denuclearization negotiations were to resume, there is reason to question whether they can be effective discussions in the current situation where dialogue has disappeared on the peninsula and the US and China are engaged in fierce strategic competition. To help accommodate for this fraught backdrop, I propose the participation of a third actor who can help balance tensions and distrust between the two sides and reliably manage negotiations: the European Union.

The EU is the right pick to coordinate and manage the sharply divided denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula. In the past, the EU has the longest experience consistently holding political talks with North Korea. The EU and North Korea held 14 EU-DPRK political dialogues up until 2015 when international sanctions against North Korea began to enter the picture. Among the various western powers, North Korea has shown particular confidence in the EU, including willingness to discuss the historically uncomfortable topic of human rights issues during EU-DPRK political dialogues.

The EU was also a key negotiator in the 2013 nuclear negotiations with Iran that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Notably, the EU has continued to support the JCPOA. The EU's position on North Korea and the union’s experience with denuclearization negotiations could prove to be helpful on the Korean Peninsula as well. Likewise, the EU has repeatedly expressed its desire to playing a role in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

Considering this, a possible future negotiation table might include the two Koreas, the United States, China, and the European Union.


3. Let's build an international non-governmental network.

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a necessary task for peace in South Korea, North Korea, Northeast Asia, and the whole world. This is not just a government-level problem but a problem for citizens, the Korean people, our compatriots abroad, and the people of the world. However, until now, discussions on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have only been dealt with in the framework of exclusive negotiations at the government level, and the role of the non-governmental sector has been limited. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this trend.

However, discussions on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the government level have not been able to stay focused on discussions on denuclearization itself. Discussions have been derailed by questions of alliances and domestic politics, including changes in presidential administrations, leading to fragmentation and instability in our negotiation strategies. Above all, we are stuck in a period characterized by icy relations and no inter-Korean dialogue without a clear path towards restoring trust. To this end, I argue that we need the strengthen the role of the non-governmental sector, particularly the role of civil society, in efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and that the state should also make active efforts to encourage the participation of non-state actors.

Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and dismantling the division on the Korean Peninsula will not be achievable by political negotiations alone. This future will only be possible when South Korea, North Korea, and the United States continue to engage in socio-cultural exchanges and build mutual trust. Clearly, the isolationist tendencies and oppressive nature of the North Korean regime make this kind of exchange difficult. However, we must also acknowledge that the South Korean and US governments are also blocking visits and exchanges with North Korea.

In particular, now that dialogue between governments has been suspended, governments should create space for civil society and the international community to take the lead in reopening dialogue and encourage exchange. North Korea is still sealed off from the outside world and only allowing the minimal necessary material exchange needed for trade. However, I predict that technological development in the ongoing fourth industrial revolution will soon bring us to a future in which we can meet North Koreans in digital space. The fact that North Korean defectors are connecting with their families despite international sanctions and North Korea’s own border blockades has enormous implications for the connective power of modern technology.

To carve out this space for non-governmental actors, we could establish an international non-governmental network for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We could join forces wtih international congressional networks such as the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND), international religious networks, and the various civil society networks across the world that have united for peace on the Korean Peninsula. For the sake of future intergovernmental negotiations, we will also need to prepare a framework in which civil society and the international community of involved countries can submit their opinions and offer consultation from experts.


Peace on the Korean Peninsula is our life

We have tried to find peace on the Korean Peninsula and solve the North Korean nuclear issue in a variety of ways. Weapons and nuclear armament may provide a moment of stability. But peace cannot last long unless the people living on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia understand each other, reconcile their differences, and cooperate with one other. Let's all act as peacemakers. Peace is not someone else’s responsibility; it is a life we must forge and protect ourselves.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article published in OhmyNews. https://omn.kr/22pbe

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