Interpreting Kim Jong-un's Statement on the 'Hostile Two-State Relationship' Regarding Inter-Korean Relations

 

*South and North Beyond the Fence of the Demilitarized Zone. @iStock 

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University

Kim Jong-un's statement on the 'hostile two-state relationship' regarding inter-Korean relations is causing controversy. Starting from the end of last year, Kim Jong-un's remarks on the "hostile two states" have shaken not only the academic community but also the political sphere and civil society in South Korea. The unfortunate aspect is that some experts have hastily defined the 'two-state system' on the Korean Peninsula as an irreversible reality and begun to seek alternatives.

I believe that we must be cautious of hasty judgments because Kim Jong-un's "hostile two states" argument differs from the process of discourse formation previously shown by North Korea. In this context, I intend to analyze Kim Jong-un's two-state theory and argue that his discourse remains incomplete.

Kim Jong-un's Claim of 'Hostile Two-State Relationship'

On December 30, 2023, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party was held, followed by the Supreme People's Assembly on January 15 this year. In these meetings, Chairman Kim Jong-un presented a "new" stance on inter-Korean relations and unification policy, advocating for a "decisive" policy shift. To help readers understand, I will summarize the key points that commonly emerged in Kim's two speeches, even if it is somewhat lengthy.

First, Kim criticized the inter-Korean and unification policies pursued by successive South Korean governments as aiming for the "collapse of the regime" and "absorption unification" of North Korea, maintaining the stance of "unification under a liberal democratic system" regardless of regime change. He stated, "Considering those who declare us (North Korea) as the 'main enemy' and seek opportunities for 'regime collapse' and 'absorption unification' in collusion with foreign forces as counterparts for reconciliation and unification is a mistake that should no longer be made." Unfortunately, our media has not properly conveyed this part.

Second, Kim argued that inter-Korean relations are "no longer fraternal and homogenous but a hostile two-state relationship, a complete state of belligerency." In his policy address at the Supreme People's Assembly, he demanded "legal measures to completely erase the established concept that South Korea is a counterpart for reconciliation and unification and a fellow countryman and to regulate it as a thoroughly foreign country, the most hostile state, accurately defining the scope of sovereignty exercised by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an independent socialist state."

Third, Kim emphasized that he would seek "fundamental principles of struggle and direction change" by acknowledging the "hostile two-state relationship." He argued that "in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to completely occupy, pacify, and restore the Republic of Korea and incorporate it into the territory of the Republic," and also insisted that expressions such as "North Korea," "independent, peaceful unification, national grand unity" should be deleted from the constitution. Furthermore, he demanded measures to "organize the organizations of the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee and other departments in charge of South Korean affairs" and to "deal with the remnants of the past era that could be seen as symbols of 'fraternal and homogenous North and South Korea,' 'our nation alone,' and 'peaceful unification.'"

In summary, Kim Jong-un claimed, first, that the South Korean government, especially since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, perceives its North Korea and unification policies as strategies for the collapse and absorption of the North Korean regime. Second, he defined the inter-Korean relationship as a hostile two-state relationship at war, not a fraternal relationship of the same nation. Third, he asserted that he would promote measures to shift existing policies towards South Korea and unification based on this definition.

Is North Korea Ready to Handle a 'Hostile Two-State Relationship' in Inter-Korean Relations?

The first thought that came to mind after hearing Kim Jong-un's "hostile two-state relationship" claim was, "How do North Korean citizens perceive Kim Jong-un's claim?" The "hostile two-state relationship" presented by Kim Jong-un goes beyond merely modifying North Korea's policy towards South Korea and unification; it redefines the so-called "socialist revolution" claimed by North Korea. This is because an important part of the North's revolutionary narrative is strongly linked to the national liberation theory, which asserts that the "South" exploited by "American imperialism" must be "liberated."

Are North Korea, its ideologues, and most importantly, the North Korean people ready to handle such a change? I do not believe North Korean society is prepared, at least at the current point in time, to handle Kim Jong-un's "hostile two-state relationship." The reasons are as follows.

As far as I have confirmed, after Kim Jong-un's two speeches mentioned above, it is difficult to find proper explanatory materials on the "hostile two-state relationship" in North Korean broadcasts, newspapers, or documents. They merely repeat Kim's remarks in the process of reporting some follow-up measures.

The authority of the leader in North Korea is absolute. However, No matter how powerful a leader may be, he(she) cannot do whatever he(she) want. The same applies to North Korea. Even when Kim Il-sung was idolized as the "brain" of the "socio-political organism" called North Korea, the ruling ideology and its sub-discourses were systematized and conveyed to the public through a theoretical process. Every society has at least a minimum social consensus structure, and North Korea has also operated a systematized consensus structure within a powerful social control system.

However, Kim Jong-un's "hostile two states" argument shows an unusual aspect different from the previous process. It is quite different from the process in which past discourses such as "Our Nation First" or "Kim Il-sung Patriotism," and more recently emphasized "Our People First" were systematized by North Korean experts, so-called ideologues, propagated, and evolved into slogans for agitation.

Can Kim Jong-un Deny the 'Achievements of Predecessors'?

There is another high mountain that Kim Jong-un's "hostile two-state relationship" must overcome. A higher mountain awaits. That is, he must overcome the "legacy of previous leaders." Kim Jong-un is still not free from the "legacy of previous leaders." In fact, Kim has pursued his own politics while putting forward the instructions of his predecessors to surpass them. However, it is not easy to completely revise the inter-Korean relations and unification strategy.

Kim Il-sung created the July 4th North-South Joint Statement and the North-South Basic Agreement, which contain the principles of unification that Kim Jong-un pointed out should be deleted, and Kim Jong-il concluded the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration and the October 4th North-South Summit Declaration. Denying the reconciliation, cooperation, and peaceful unification agreements of the North and South is equivalent to denying the achievements, or "legacy," of previous leaders. It is unthinkable in North Korean society to deny the "instructions of previous leaders" simply because of South Korea's policy towards North Korea and unification. How can Kim Jong-un solve this problem?

It is highly likely that confusion regarding this issue also exists within the North Korean ruling class. Perhaps Kim Jong-un is taking a dangerous gamble that could confuse North Korea's ruling elite.

Manage Inter-Korean Relations with Cold-Headed Judgment

It has been five years since inter-Korean relations were severed. During this time, North Korea has been seeking new survival strategies with China and Russia. The strong international sanctions alliance against North Korea is losing its function due to the defection of China and Russia. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is also challenging. Amid the serious surrounding situation of the Korean Peninsula, we must manage inter-Korean relations stably and seek new changes.

Kim Jong-un has clearly shown his intention to redefine inter-Korean relations and overhaul the unification strategy into a "hostile two-state relationship." It is also true that he has taken some visible measures in this regard.

However, the "hostile two-state relationship" he claimed is not yet complete. It is too early to accept this as an irreversible result, given that this issue could act as a political risk within North Korean society. This discourse is still incomplete. It is dangerous for our government or experts to hastily accept it as a completed North Korean policy and reflect it in policy.

While explaining Kim Jong-un's "hostile two-state relationship," I did not use the word "North Korea" as the subject. North Korea can no longer be singularly named with just the leader's name. Conversely, the entire North Korean society should not be generalized with the term "North Korea." We must act cautiously with a cold-headed judgment.

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.