South Korea’s New Government Must Realize Participatory Democracy in Its North Korea and Unification Policy
Il Young Jeong
Research Professor_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University
With the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration in South Korea, the propaganda broadcasts that once echoed across the inter-Korean border have come to a halt. This is perhaps one of the most dramatic signs of the change brought about by the shift in power. Encouraged by North Korea’s active response, the South Korean government is now cautiously exploring ways to resume inter-Korean dialogue.
Recently, the Lee administration launched the National Policy Planning Committee, chaired by Lee Han-joo, and has begun the process of formulating policy tasks across various sectors. This article proposes steps the government should take to restore procedural democracy and realize participatory democracy in the formulation and implementation of its North Korea and unification policies.
An Old Temptation: Government Monopoly over North Korea and Unification Policy
Regardless of whether the administration has been conservative or progressive, successive South Korean governments have exercised exclusive authority over North Korea and unification policy. This monopoly, which has rejected procedural democracy, has led to policy distortion and the political misuse of inter-Korean affairs. The most extreme example was seen during the three years of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which culminated in the declaration of martial law—a move that attempted to exploit the fragile links of the Korean division system to undermine democracy.
The monopolization of policymaking by the presidential office and government ministries is not a new problem. However, in the realm of North Korea and unification policy, the issue has been especially pronounced. The government’s exclusive grip has long been justified by the sensitive nature of inter-Korean issues—namely, concerns over national security and secrecy. While previous democratic administrations made efforts to mitigate this monopoly and enhance the roles of civil society and the National Assembly, these efforts were limited in scope and short-lived.
Now, with the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, a new question arises: can the government resist this old temptation and break away from its exclusive control of North Korea and unification policy? Can it establish a democratic policymaking process that includes civil society and the legislature?
Encouragingly, during the 21st presidential election, President Lee pledged to "strengthen cooperation with the National Assembly to pursue sustainable North Korea and unification policies" and to "promote national communication and establish a platform for social dialogue.“
Can the government fulfill these promises? What concrete steps are necessary? First, let us examine the North Korea and unification policy proposals that have been put forward by South Korea’s civil society.
What Was Included in the North Korea and Unification Policy Agreement Between the Democratic Party and Civil Society?
During South Korea’s 21st presidential election, the Citizens’ Peace Forum and other civil society organizations signed a policy agreement with the Democratic Party’s Committee for Peace and Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, part of its campaign headquarters. The agreement outlines a shared commitment to improving inter-Korean relations, establishing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and strengthening the role of civil society in this process. Its main points include the following:
First, to prevent accidental clashes and ensure the safety of residents, the agreement calls for regulating the distribution of leaflets near border areas and the Military Demarcation Line, halting loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and military exercises in these areas, and working to restore the inter-Korean military hotline and the September 19 Military Agreement.
Second, to ensure consistency and efficiency in North Korea policy, the agreement proposes reforming the existing policy implementation system. This includes enhancing the coherence of the Ministry of Unification’s policies on reducing hostility, promoting exchanges and cooperation, and addressing humanitarian issues, while coordinating related responsibilities across government ministries.
Third, the agreement calls for the establishment of legal and institutional measures to expand civil society participation in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. It also emphasizes the need to guarantee the stability, continuity, and autonomy of these activities, and to simplify related administrative procedures.
Fourth, the agreement affirms a clear rejection of unification through force or coercion and advocates for peaceful, gradual unification. It calls for the development of North Korea and unification policies and institutional reforms that promote stable peaceful coexistence and cooperation based on mutual respect between the two Koreas.
Fifth, to ease social conflicts surrounding inter-Korean relations and ideological divisions and to build a foundation for national consensus, the agreement calls for institutionalizing “Social Dialogue on Peace and Unification.” This would ensure direct citizen participation and promote non-partisan cooperation among politicians and civil society. It also recommends reforming existing unification education into a broader peace and unification education system through legal and institutional improvements.
Sixth, to establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and address the nuclear threat, the agreement supports sustained efforts for dialogue and negotiation. It calls for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through measures such as ending hostile relations, building military trust, and reducing mutual threats. It also emphasizes the importance of improving South Korea’s relations with China and Russia while supporting the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States, and between North Korea and Japan.
Through these provisions, civil society is urging legal and institutional reforms to ensure stable and sustained participation in the development of North Korea and unification policy, as well as inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The government must take this agreement seriously. To honor its commitments, it must be willing to cede some of its authority and take concrete steps to ensure that civil society has a meaningful role in the policymaking process.
What Role Should the National Assembly Play in North Korea and Unification Policy?
The National Assembly bears the primary responsibility for checking the executive branch’s monopoly over policy. Its main tools for overseeing the government’s North Korea and unification policy include legislative activities and the review of various master and annual plans that the government is required to report to the Assembly.
First, through its legislative authority, the Assembly must play an active role in scrutinizing and guiding government policy. In particular, it must modernize the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, which serves as the legal foundation for inter-Korean relations, and the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which defines the procedures for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation—both of which must be revised in accordance with the changing times.
Second, the Assembly must be actively involved in ensuring that the government’s master and annual plans, as mandated by law, are properly formulated and implemented. Under current law, the government is only required to report its North Korea and unification policy plans to the Assembly. The problem is that the Assembly has no authority to regulate or revise these plans once reported. As a result, governments have often submitted these reports perfunctorily, with minimal effort or accountability.
For example, in 2023, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration submitted the Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations and the Comprehensive Plan for the Promotion of North Korean Human Rights to the National Assembly only in November and December of that year. To improve this process, the National Assembly should go beyond simply receiving reports and institutionalize a formal procedure to review and deliberate these plans in detail.
Under the Lee Jae-myung administration, the Assembly’s role in holding the government accountable will face a different kind of test—because the ruling Democratic Party holds a supermajority of seats. If the Assembly fails to properly check the administration, the Lee government may enjoy greater autonomy—but such unchecked power would be a poisoned chalice. This is why the role of the Democratic Party is more critical than ever.
Ultimately, the key challenge lies in whether the majority party can engage in dialogue and reach consensus with the opposition through compromise. If the Assembly does not effectively hold the government in check, the administration will remain vulnerable to the persistent temptation of monopolizing policy.
To Resist the Temptation of Policy Monopoly
The Lee Jae-myung administration finds itself in an unprecedented position of power—holding both executive and legislative authority. In short, it has the capacity to exercise stronger policy control than any previous administration. However, we have already seen under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration the consequences of an executive that rejects participatory democracy.
The Lee administration was born out of the people’s resistance against anti-democratic forces. To avoid falling into the seductive trap of policy monopoly, it must voluntarily relinquish part of its authority and commit to realizing participatory democracy. This will not be easy. But it is a necessary and urgent task.
For decades, we have witnessed how each change in administration has resulted in a complete “reset” of North Korea and unification policy. We hope the Lee administration will break this cycle by restoring procedural democracy in policymaking and working together with civil society and the National Assembly to build a sustainable North Korea and unification policy.
*IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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