People’s Sovereignty Before ROK–U.S. Coordination on North Korea

 

*On July 31, 2025, South Korea's Foreign Minister, Park Hyun, is shaking hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio during the Korea-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the United States. ⓒ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Il Young Jeong

Senior Research Fellow_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University

South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sparked controversy by pushing to establish a regular policy coordination meeting with the United States on North Korea policy. At a regular press briefing on December 9, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Park Il stated that the government is working the convening of a “regular ROK–U.S. policy coordination meeting (TF)” to discuss “overall North Korea policy, including measures for engagement with North Korea.”

The Lee Jae-myung government has declared itself a government of popular sovereignty and has emphasized a North Korea policy based on the sovereignty of the people. Yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—rather than the ministry primarily responsible for North Korea policy—is taking the lead in coordinating North Korea policy with the United States. This article points out the problems with the Foreign Ministry’s ROK–U.S. coordination on North Korea policy and calls for its immediate suspension.

 

The Foreign Ministry’s Involvement in North Korea Policy Lacks Legal Basis

To date, the South Korean government has maintained a clear division of roles: the Ministry of Unification oversees North Korea and unification policy encompassing overall inter-Korean relations, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for multilateral diplomatic efforts aimed at denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime. This division of responsibilities is explicitly stipulated in Korean law.

The Government Organization Act specifies the roles of government ministries. The Minister of Unification is charged with “the establishment of policies on unification and inter-Korean dialogue, exchange, and cooperation; unification education; and other affairs related to unification” (Article 34). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, meanwhile, is responsible for “diplomacy, economic diplomacy and international economic cooperation diplomacy, coordination of international relations affairs, treaties and other international agreements, protection and support of overseas Koreans, and the investigation and analysis of international situations” (Article 33).

This division is also clearly reflected in the state affairs agenda that laid out the five-year blueprint of the Lee Jae-myung government. According to the Draft Five-Year Plan for State Administration of the Lee Jae-myung Government formulated last August by the Presidential Committee on State Affairs Planning, the government explicitly designates the Ministry of Unification as the lead ministry for North Korea and unification policy. It assigns the Ministry of Unification responsibility for five key tasks (National Tasks Nos. 114–118) aimed at realizing a “Korean Peninsula of peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity.”

In contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is tasked with carrying out five separate initiatives (National Tasks Nos. 119–123) under the goal of “pragmatic diplomacy reaching out to the world.” Among these, the only task related to North Korea is “seeking tangible progress toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” (National Task No. 122).

There is no doubt that close and organic cooperation with the United States is necessary in the process of pursuing North Korea policy. Especially at a time when inter-Korean relations are effectively severed, the government must actively pursue multilateral cooperation with the international community, including the United States. However, the principal authority for North Korea policy is clearly the Ministry of Unification. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assume responsibilities not granted to it by law constitutes an overreach of authority and may also raise concerns of illegality.

 

ROK–U.S. Policy Coordination at Odds with a “People’s Sovereignty–Based North Korea Policy”

The Lee Jae-myung government was launched by the choice of the Korean people, who stood firmly against the insurrectionary forces that triggered the December 3 martial law and defended the constitutional order at great personal cost. For this reason, the Lee administration has defined itself as a “government of popular sovereignty.” In the same vein, Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young formally articulated the principle of a “people’s sovereignty–based North Korea policy” in his inaugural address.

In line with this vision, the Lee government has set forth as a national task the goal of “advancing peace and unification policy on the Korean Peninsula together with the people.” It has pledged to “establish and operate a framework for social dialogue that expands and institutionalizes direct public participation in North Korea and unification policy.” Yet to speak of ROK–U.S. policy coordination even before a people’s sovereignty–based North Korea policy has begun is fundamentally contradictory and logically untenable.

In the end, does this not amount to proclaiming a “people’s sovereignty–based North Korea policy” in words while reverting, in practice, to a state-led and exclusive approach to North Korea policy? To date, successive governments—conservative and progressive alike—have exercised exclusive authority over North Korea and unification policy. Citing national security concerns and the sensitivity of information, they have blocked participation by civil society. The outcome of this approach ultimately culminated in the December 3 martial law and the ensuing insurrection.

 

The Government Must Not Repeat the Failure of the 2018 ROK–U.S. Working Group

The ROK–U.S. policy coordination meeting on North Korea being pursued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inevitably recalls the ROK–U.S. Working Group that was launched in 2018. Established in November 2018, the Working Group has since been widely criticized as an obstacle that hindered South Korea’s North Korea policy and efforts to normalize inter-Korean relations.

In 2018, the Korean Peninsula saw a breakthrough in inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea dialogue sparked by the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. This momentum led to the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between the two Koreas, the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement. However, the ROK–U.S. Working Group, which was formed during this process, fell far short of its stated purpose as a forum for working-level coordination. Instead, it repeatedly intervened in South Korea’s North Korea policy, generating friction and controversy, before ultimately being dissolved in June 2021.

The government must not repeat the failure of the ROK–U.S. Working Group. Above all, before involving itself in North Korea policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should first reflect on and critically examine why the Working Group failed. It should also focus on its own core responsibilities—namely, determining what it can and should do to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The government must not forget why the Korean people chose the Lee Jae-myung administration. It must once again reflect on why it has defined itself as a “government of popular sovereignty.” The government should halt the ROK–U.S. coordination meeting on North Korea policy and return to a truly “people’s sovereignty–based North Korea policy.” The legitimacy and strength of the Lee Jae-myung government’s North Korea policy must be derived from the will and demands of the people.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.