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Il Young Jeong
Senior Research Fellow_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University
On August 15, President Lee Jae-myung, in his address marking the 80th anniversary of Korea’s Liberation, stated that “the South and the North are in a special relationship in which both sides should respect and recognize each other’s systems, while pursuing peaceful unification.” He further emphasized that “the South respects the current system in the North, will not seek any form of unification by absorption, and has no intention of engaging in hostile acts.”
In relation to this, on August 13, the National Policy Planning Committee, which finalized the state agenda of the Lee administration, proposed the task of “redefining inter-Korean relations on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation and institutionalizing peaceful coexistence.” To this end, it announced its plan to pursue the conclusion of an “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,” modeled after the 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany, which laid the foundation for German unification. This indicates a determination to resolve the instability caused by the dissonance between reality and institutions in inter-Korean relations and to reestablish a new framework for the relationship.
This article seeks to explore how the character of a new inter-Korean relationship should be shaped in light of the changing dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.
Two States on the Korean Peninsula, Yet Not States to Each Other?
In international politics, there exist two states on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have defined this existence differently at different times.
From the outset, each government established on the peninsula—the ROK and the DPRK—has refused to recognize the other as a state. Since its founding in 1948, the ROK has claimed sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands, defining North Korea as an “anti-state entity.” The DPRK, likewise, has denied the ROK’s statehood, instead defining it as a target (and space) to be “liberated.”
Despite this mutual negation, the two Koreas began taking steps toward recognition of each other in the course of the Cold War’s collapse. By joining the United Nations simultaneously in September 1991, they acknowledged each other’s statehood within the realm of international politics. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ROK currently maintains diplomatic relations with 194 countries, while the DPRK has relations with 159. In international politics, both the ROK and the DPRK are undeniably recognized as separate states.
Amid the transformations of the post–Cold War era, the two Koreas sought to address the dissonance between institutional arrangements and political realities. The peculiar situation of not recognizing each other as states domestically, while existing as two states internationally, was conceptually framed as a “special relationship.”
In this context, the two sides concluded the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, ‘Inter-Korean Basic Agreement’. There, they agreed to “acknowledge that the relationship between the South and the North is not a relationship between states but a special interim relationship formed in the process toward unification, and to make joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification.” Thus emerged the so-called theory of the special inter-Korean relationship.
Inter-Korean Relations No Longer “Special”
The theory of a special inter-Korean relationship was a compromise between two normative frameworks: the international norm recognizing the existence of two states on the Korean Peninsula, and the domestic norm under which both Seoul and Pyongyang refused to recognize the other as a state.
The proposition that inter-Korean relations are “special” granted both governments a degree of political autonomy within the armistice system, allowing them to establish negotiating channels and pursue exchanges and cooperation. This led to what is often referred to as the “golden era” of inter-Korean relations in the 2000s. However, such autonomy remained relatively unstable. Since inter-Korean relations were never institutionalized, they easily collapsed. Agreements concluded in the absence of a “state-to-state” framework were treated merely as “gentlemen’s agreements,” deprived of legal force, and eventually lapsed into obsolescence.
Let us return to the starting point: in what sense are inter-Korean relations special? They are special insofar as the two Koreas, while locked in hostility under the armistice regime, are also bound by the aspiration for unification. Yet this very specialness is eroding. How so?
Above all, the shared goal of unification is wavering. In December 2023, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared the principle of “two hostile states,” asserting that inter-Korean relations are “no longer those of fellow countrymen or people of the same nation, but a hostile relationship between two states, a complete belligerent relationship in the midst of war.” He further argued that constitutional references to “the northern half of the territory,” “independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity” should now be removed. While Kim’s position cannot be definitively regarded as an irreversible abandonment of the instructions of his predecessors or of unification policy, it is nonetheless an undeniable fact that the North Korean leader has publicly expressed such an intention.
What, then, of the Republic of Korea? The South’s Constitution and laws continue to enshrine unification as a national goal. Yet public perceptions of unification have reached historically low levels. According to the 2024 Unification Perception Survey conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (November 2024), 36.9% of South Koreans responded that “unification is necessary,” slightly higher than the 35% who said it is “not necessary.” However, this marks the lowest level of support ever recorded. Moreover, when asked about the prospects for unification, the proportion of respondents answering “impossible” reached an unprecedented high of 39%.
Why Unification? A Question the Younger Generation Cannot Answer
The deterioration of public attitudes toward unification can, in the short term, be attributed to the North’s development of nuclear weapons and other threats, and to the South Korean government’s response—particularly under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration—which pursued a hardline policy toward the North and advanced an “absorption unification” doctrine, thereby heightening inter-Korean tensions. In this sense, weakened perceptions of unification could be partially restored through the recovery of inter-Korean relations.
The greater problem, however, lies in the decline of unification consciousness among the younger generations—an outcome that reflects not only the current dynamics on the Korean Peninsula but also deeper structural factors. According to the aforementioned survey, respondents in their 20s and 30s expressed the view that “unification is unnecessary” at a rate twice as high as those who said it is “necessary.”
In a context where the normative claim—“we must unify because we are one people”—is fading, the younger generation is unable to find a compelling answer to the question of why unification should occur. This is also symptomatic of deficiencies in unification education in South Korea, where understanding of North Korea is lower than understanding of the United States or China. It is a paradoxical and troubling situation to ask people whether they support unification when they lack even a basic understanding of North Korea.
Ultimately, as the reality of two separate states on the Korean Peninsula persists, the logic of a “special relationship aimed at unification” is becoming increasingly disconnected from reality. The pressing question, then, is how we are to address this challenge.
West Germany’s Wisdom in Accepting a “De Facto Two-State Relationship”
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea stipulates that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and pursue a peaceful unification policy based on the basic order of liberal democracy.” While public perceptions of unification have deteriorated, it is paradoxical that, even amid the worst state of inter-Korean relations, unification still enjoys broader support. It remains clear that unification is the ultimate solution for overcoming the division system on the peninsula and establishing lasting peace.
Yet it is also a reality that the two states existing de facto on the Korean Peninsula cannot be indefinitely bound together under the framework of a mere “special relationship.” In this respect, the current inter-Korean relationship overlaps in many ways with that between East and West Germany. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) insisted on defining East–West relations as those between two separate states, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), bound by its Basic Law (constitution) to pursue national unification, could not fully accept such a claim. At the same time, it could not simply deny the existence of two states in international politics. What, then, did West Germany choose?
Following the inauguration of Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969, under the banner of Ostpolitik, West Germany adopted an approach that de facto acknowledged East Germany’s “statehood” while maintaining that East–West German relations were not those of foreign states but of a “special character.” In other words, West Germany recognized the reality of two states without granting East Germany full recognition as a sovereign state under international law. This approach was even challenged before the Constitutional Court by the opposition party but was ultimately upheld as constitutional.
West Germany’s formula for defining the two Germanies thus accepted the reality of two existing states while preserving the “special character” of a relationship oriented toward unification. In doing so, it created political space that enabled the exercise of autonomy between the two sides and resolved institutional instability. This precedent suggests a way by which South Korea might also manage—within institutional bounds—the potential confusion that could arise if it were to recognize North Korea formally as a state.
Toward a Productive Debate on a New Inter-Korean Relationship
Since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, inter-Korean relations have cautiously pursued confidence-building measures even amid ongoing tensions. In this process, there is a pressing need for a societal discussion on a new framework for inter-Korean relations that reflects the changed realities and institutions of the Korean Peninsula as well as the shifting public perceptions of unification.
Debates on recognizing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a state have long been burdened with ideological judgments, which in turn have blinded us to the evolving realities. According to a survey conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 52.1% of respondents agreed with the statement that “North Korea is also a state,” while only 11.3% disagreed. It is time to openly discuss a new type of inter-Korean relationship.
In international politics, the existence of two states on the Korean Peninsula can neither be denied nor needs to be denied. The challenge before us is to find ways by which these two states can coexist, pursue mutual prosperity, and orient themselves toward peace and eventual unification. To this end, we must pool our collective wisdom.
*IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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