Making Peaceful Coexistence Work on the Korean Peninsula

 

*The joint presidential briefing by the Ministry of Unification, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of National Defense for the second half of 2026 is being held at the Blue House on August 5, 2026. © Blue House

Il Young Jeong

Senior Research Fellow_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University

On August 5, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense jointly presented their policy reports to President Lee Jae-myung for the second half of 2026. Traditionally, presidential policy briefings have been held only once at the beginning of the year. The Lee government, however, added a summer briefing as a midterm assessment of its policies. The occasion also served as an opportunity to evaluate and adjust the government’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula over the past year.

In this column, I will examine the Lee Jae-myung government’s policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, identify its key challenges, and propose ways to address them.

 

Why a Policy of Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula?

In his speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule—the first Liberation Day address of his presidency in August 2025—President Lee Jae-myung called for the opening of “a new era on the Korean Peninsula based on peaceful coexistence and shared growth,” bringing an end to an era of confrontation and hostility.

In this context, President Lee emphasized the three core principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence: respecting North Korea’s current political system, not pursuing unification through absorption in any form, and having no intention of engaging in hostile acts against North Korea.

Why, then, is a policy of peaceful coexistence necessary?

In 2017, in response to North Korea’s nuclear development, the international community imposed unprecedentedly strong sanctions on Pyongyang. China, Russia, and South Korea joined these sanctions, creating what could be described as a “sanctions coalition against North Korea.” Then, in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led North Korea to seal its borders and further isolate itself from the outside world. North Korea was effectively pushed into a crisis that threatened the very survival of the state.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula, however, began to change dramatically after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. North Korea’s dispatch of troops to support Russia rapidly transformed the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow into something approaching a military alliance. In addition, with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang this past June, relations between North Korea and China are also being restored.

As a result, the once-solid coalition of countries imposing sanctions on North Korea has begun to unravel, while North Korea—once regarded as an isolated pariah—has emerged as a significant variable shaping the strategic environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

By contrast, inter-Korean relations have deteriorated toward the brink of rupture. The so-called “Spring of the Korean Peninsula,” which began with the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, quickly turned into a deep freeze after the February 2019 Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States ended without an agreement.

The situation was further aggravated under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, as mutual distrust between the two Koreas reached an extreme level, including allegations that drones were sent to Pyongyang in what was viewed as a provocation against North Korea and was subsequently used to justify an attempted insurrection. Ultimately, in December 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations as those between “two hostile states,” going so far as to reject both the notion of a shared Korean identity and the goal of reunification.

We are now living in an era in which the norms of the free-trade system are being undermined amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, while the logic of power increasingly dominates international relations. Given the continuing instability on the Korean Peninsula and the deep freeze in inter-Korean relations, what kind of policy should we pursue?

First and foremost, we must rule out the possibility of armed conflict between the two Koreas and establish the norm of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

The policy of peaceful coexistence is therefore more than a pragmatic policy choice. It is a strategy for survival.

 

The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula Is Both a North Korea Policy and a Foreign Policy

The Lee Jae-myung government’s policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula is the best available choice for managing the unstable security environment on the peninsula and the frozen state of inter-Korean relations. In this sense, the policy is not merely a North Korea policy; it is also an active peace diplomacy strategy. Yet this is precisely where a problem has emerged.

In its policy briefing to the president on August 5, the Ministry of Unification emphasized that “peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula is the only path we should pursue” and announced plans to use the political calendar at home and abroad during the second half of the year to create a “dramatic turning point for peaceful coexistence.” But peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula is not an objective that the Ministry of Unification can achieve on its own. Above all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must share a clear understanding of peaceful coexistence and actively pursue peace diplomacy.

Yet since the launch of the Lee Jae-myung government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appeared to stand on the sidelines when it comes to the policy of peaceful coexistence. Its stance has often seemed almost as though it does not accept the policy itself.

In its briefing for the second half of the year, the Foreign Ministry proposed “reducing tensions and pursuing peaceful coexistence, and a peace for which there is no need to fight” as a key policy priority. However, rather than embracing the three principles at the heart of the government’s peaceful coexistence policy, the ministry has focused on a different approach centered on engaging North Korea.

Against this backdrop, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun’s comments following the presidential policy briefings were particularly inappropriate. He dismissed the Ministry of Unification’s vision for advancing peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula—including its proposal for four-party talks—as merely “idealistic.” Was this not, in effect, a rejection of the very policy that the president and the government had publicly declared and were actively pursuing?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the government agency primarily responsible for promoting the policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula internationally and building broader support for it. At a time when the ministry should be exploring four-party dialogue in Northeast Asia on its own initiative, it is difficult to understand why it would instead dismiss such an idea as “idealistic.”

The Foreign Ministry’s reluctance to embrace the policy of peaceful coexistence had already become apparent in December 2025, when it sought to establish a “regular policy coordination meeting between South Korea and the United States (TF)” to “discuss overall policy toward North Korea, including ways to engage with North Korea.” The initiative was ultimately suspended amid criticism that the proposed mechanism was simply a revival of the failed “U.S.-ROK Working Group” launched in 2018. Has the Foreign Ministry forgotten the lessons of that experience?

In conclusion, the Foreign Ministry’s current approach—effectively undermining the government’s own policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula—must be corrected.

 

Why Is the Restoration of the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement Being Delayed?

In his August 2025 Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae-myung pledged to “restore the September 19 Military Agreement proactively and in stages” in order to prevent accidental clashes between the two Koreas and build military trust. In other words, he promised to gradually restore the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement, which had been suspended under the Yoon Suk Yeol government. This was also a pledge he made during the presidential campaign and can be regarded as one of the most fundamental measures for establishing peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

In September 2018, the two Koreas concluded the “September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement” (the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain). Under the agreement, they pledged to “completely cease all hostile acts against each other that are the source of military tension and conflict in all domains, including land, sea, and air,” and agreed “not to intrude into, attack, or occupy the other side’s jurisdiction by any means or methods.” However, in June 2024, the Yoon Suk Yeol government suspended the entire agreement for reasons that were difficult to justify, effectively removing an important safety mechanism against armed conflict between the two Koreas.

The September 19 Military Agreement was a historic accord that sought to prevent physical confrontation between the two Koreas and revive the dormant armistice regime by restoring the demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Its provisions were so comprehensive that they came close in substance to those of a peace agreement. It can therefore be regarded as an essential safeguard for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Yet the restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement continues to be postponed. Why? 

The problem lies with the Ministry of National Defense. The September 19 Military Agreement may fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Unification insofar as it is an “inter-Korean agreement.” But if the South Korean government is to restore the agreement “proactively,” as President Lee has pledged, the Ministry of National Defense must take the lead as the ministry responsible for implementing it.

Yet, remarkably, the September 19 Military Agreement was not mentioned even once in the Ministry of National Defense’s policy briefing for the second half of 2026.

Some argue that restoring the agreement would amount to making concessions on our national security. They contend that restoring the September 19 agreement would restrict South Korea’s military exercises along the front line.

But what are those military exercises for? At a time when North Korea is constructing anti-tank barriers along the DMZ, what reason is there for South Korea to conduct military exercises directed toward North Korea in the border areas?

The forces behind the December 3 insurrection sought to provoke North Korea in an attempt to create a pretext for their actions. In the process, they dismantled the safety mechanism provided by the September 19 Military Agreement.

That is precisely why the Ministry of National Defense must take responsibility for restoring the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement and bring this issue to a proper resolution.

 

There Can Be No Disagreement Over Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula

There should be no disagreement over the pursuit of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, the Presidential Office must take the lead in resolving the policy conflicts that have emerged among government ministries. The government must now pursue its policies toward North Korea, diplomacy, and national defense in a consistent and coordinated manner, with peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula as their guiding principle.

In this regard, the government should make active use of the ongoing social dialogue on issues concerning the Korean Peninsula. The Lee Jae-myung government has presented itself as a government of popular sovereignty. I therefore propose that, going beyond the institutional boundaries between government ministries, the government bring together the collective wisdom of the Korean people on peaceful coexistence as one of the country’s most important national priorities and reflect that wisdom in its policies.

 

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.