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Balancing the Generality of International Relations with the Specificity of Inter-Korean Relations


*In addition to the generality of international relations, the special characteristics of inter-Korean relations coexist on the Korean Peninsula. The north and south of Panmunjom. iStock

 

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University


Inter-Korean relations are frozen. The rupture in inter-Korean relations is, in part, the result of the subordination of inter-Korean relations to the generality of international politics. Yet, inter-Korean relations clearly possess a special nature that does not cleanly fit into general international politics.

However, inter-Korean relations as they are right now are neither special nor exceptional. With inter-Korean relations subordinated to general international relations, what exactly is the problem, and how do we solve it?

 

Inter-Korean Relations are Unique

The South and the North acknowledge that "the relationship between the two sides is not a relationship between two countries, but rather a special relationship that has been formed provisionally as part of the process of unification." This acknowledgement appears in the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation between North and South Korea” (the "Inter-Korean Basic Agreement") signed on December 13, 1991, and subsequently shaped the broader nature of inter-Korean relations.

The “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,” which is responsible for the distinct characteristics of inter-Korean relations, has determined the nature of North-South relations for over 30 years. The “Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act,” which could be considered the foundational legal basis of inter-Korean relations, specifies in Article 3 (North-South Relations) “the relationship between the two Koreas is not that of between two countries, but rather a special relationship that has been formed provisionally as part of the process of unification.” It also stipulates that “transactions between North and South Korea are not transactions between states but transactions amongst a common people (minjok).”

Since the agreement in 1991, the South and the North have recognized their relationship as a special relationship aimed at unification rather than as a state-to-state relationship, and as such enjoy certain benefits. One such benefit appears in the field of economic cooperation where inter-Korean dealings are privileged as ‘transactions amongst a common people (minjok)’ and enjoy special benefits like exemptions from tariffs. The special relationship between North and South also manifests in the realm of travel. When South Koreans visit the North, they need only present a “visit license” issued by the Ministry of Unification, rather than be issued a visa or present their passport.

 

The Special Nature of Inter-Korean Relations, Kept Secondary to International Relations

While it might have been true in the past, are inter-Korean relations still special? Perhaps not. In 2016 and 2017, North Korea continuously conducted nuclear tests and launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. In response, the UN Security Council adopted new, strict sanctions against North Korea, and the international sanctions regime against North Korea wiped out the unique elements of inter-Korean relations.

The international community's sanctions on North Korea are fundamentally measures to strictly control the inflow and outflow of goods, people, and money to the North. In doing so, the sanctions also blocked existing investment in North Korea, financial transactions, and overseas employment for North Koreans. With the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in February of 2016, the idea of ‘exceptional’ inter-Korean relations that could stand apart from the international sanctions regime has disappeared.

In 2018, the two Koreas tried to restore their special relations through the “Panmunjom Declaration" and the “September Pyongyang Joint Declaration.” In the “Panmunjom Declaration,” the two Koreas agreed to "completely implement previously adopted inter-Korean declarations and agreements'' and "revitalize multilateral exchanges, cooperation, and contact across all levels of society" in the name of "broad, epochal improvement and development of inter-Korean relations."

In the “September Pyongyang Joint Declaration,” the two parties agreed to move forward to, "as conditions are worked out, normalize the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Kumgang Mountain tour projects and to consult on the issue of creating the West Sea Joint Economic Zone and the East Sea Joint Special Tour Zone."

However, these agreements were thwarted by international sanctions. No, rather, the South Korean government failed to honor the special nature of inter-Korean relations and sufficiently separate itself from the sanctions regime against North Korea. The window of opportunity had briefly opened in 2018, only to eventually close again. Perhaps it will be difficult to restore the special nature of inter-Korean relations until North Korea fully denuclearizes.

 

We Must Protect the Special Nature of Inter-Korean Relations

Now, we must ask ourselves again, “Are inter-Korean relations special?” Actually, more theoretically, what exactly makes inter-Korean relations special?

Under the current division of the Korean peninsula, the two Koreas are left facing each other militarily. With no conclusion to the war, we remain in a state of confrontation with each other. However, the two Koreas continue to coexist through cooperation and ultimately strive for re-unification. The unique nature of inter-Korean relations is connected to our own survival.

The division of the peninsula compels us to avoid armed conflict on the peninsula and to work to establish a permanent peace regime. In the end, inter-Korean relations are special because we ourselves are an involved party to the issue, making it all the more urgent of a proposition.

In the past, East and West Germany made constant efforts to gain recognition from the United States, the Soviet Union, and neighboring countries for the unique nature of East-West German relations. As a result, the special nature of East-West German relations came to be accepted as a norm in the international community.

Clearly, North Korea's nuclear development should be stopped, and the international community should work together on this issue. However, alongside international efforts, the special nature of inter-Korean relations is a key element in solving the problem on the Korean Peninsula. Stabilization of inter-Korean relations has come to be a major foundation on which to advance dialogue and solve problems arising on the peninsula.

In 2018, the two Koreas agreed in the “September Pyongyang Joint Declaration” to make efforts to resume existing exchange and cooperation projects. This does not neutralize international consensus in favor of the special nature of inter-Korean relations, rather it is an additional tool to solve problems on the peninsula.

With the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula, we must re-consider whether the future we want for the Korean peninsula necessitates accepting the current division of the peninsula and 'state-to-state' relationships rather than fostering a special relationship aiming at North-South unification. Peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula is a problem that no one can solve on our behalf. It is a Korean issue, and a challenge that Korean must solve on our own.


*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article is a column published in OhmyNews. https://omn.kr/1zmjh



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