Is the government's monopoly on inter-Korean relations justified?

 

*In inter-Korean relations, the South Korean administration has exercised exclusive powers. ⓒiStock

 

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea stipulates the separation of the three branches of government: legislative, judicial, and executive. However, when it comes to inter-Korean relations, this division of powers is completely overshadowed by the absolute power of the executive branch. Since the signing of the 7.4 Inter-Korean Joint Statement in 1972, inter-Korean relations have become the exclusive domain of the executive branch.

Of course, this isn’t to say that there has been no inter-Korean dialogue with the National Assembly or Korean civil society. However, these conversations took place in a strictly limited capacity under government control. In this article, I will evaluate the government's monopoly on inter-Korean relations and re-assess the National Assembly’s role in inter-Korean affairs.

 

Who will deal with North Korea?

Up until the adoption of the “Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act” in December of 2005, the South Korean government exercised an exclusive jurisdiction over negotiations with North Korea. Before the act, inter-Korean dialogue has been regarded as an ‘act of the state’ by the President, and major talks - such as summit meetings and inter-Korean agreements - have been secretly drawn up through negotiations between the authorities of the two Koreas. Most inter-Korean agreements could only be confirmed after the written agreement was officially announced.

What then has changed since the adoption of the ‘Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act?’ Ultimately, not much. The Korean National Assembly enacted the ‘Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ in December 2005, through which it legislated the main content of inter-Korean negotiations and inter-Korean agreements. Article 21 of the Act stipulates that the president may "sign and ratify inter-Korean agreements, and the Minister of Unification assists the president in related work." Article 15 rules that "the Minister of Unification will act as the [South’s] representative at inter-Korean talks in negotiations, talks with North Korea, and when signing inter-Korean agreements."

In this regard, the president may grant the 'special envoy to North Korea' the 'authority to sign inter-Korean agreements'. However, it is true that government officials have played the role of special envoys to North Korea and representatives of inter-Korean talks so far.

Ultimately, inter-Korean negotiations and the inter-Korean agreements that arise from those negotiations have come to be defined as “written agreements between the [South Korean] government and the North Korean authorities,” further serving to strengthen the government’s exclusive jurisdiction over inter-Korean relations. Under the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act, "anyone represents the government" and "negotiates or talks with North Korea" or "signs or names an inter-Korean agreement" is strictly prohibited(Article 17).

In August 2009, amid the freeze in relations on the Korean Peninsula, then-Chairman of Hyundai Group Hyun Jeong-eun agreed with North Korean leader Chairman Kim Jong-il, on five points to restore overall inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects, including the resumption of tours to Mt. Kumgang.

However, the South Korean government did not recognize the written agreement document as a normal inter-Korean agreement. The reasoning behind the refusal was that the agreement had violated the government's exclusive right to negotiate with North Korea.

 

Why is the National Assembly weak in inter-Korean relations?

Under the current legal system, there are two ways for the National Assembly to participate in inter-Korean relations. One is to promote direct inter-Korean dialogue, and the other is to exercise the authority of the National Assembly as stipulated in the current law.

First, the South Korean National Assembly can promote inter-Korean dialogue, and it has attempted to do so in the past. Since 1985, the National Assembly has held 12 preliminary talks (2 preliminary contacts, 10 preparatory meetings) with the aim of ultimately holding inter-Korean parliamentary talks. In other words, 12 working-level meetings were held to prepare for the official meeting of the two parliaments.

In the end, hopes for formal inter-Korean parliamentary talks ended in February 1990 with the 10th preliminary contact meeting. Ultimately, the process dragged on too long and a formal inter-parliamentary talk never materialized. Since then, numerous National Assembly speakers have proposed inter-Korean parliamentary talks to North Korea, but these proposals have failed to gain momentum.

Second, the National Assembly could exercise the powers granted to it in the’ Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act.’ The Act requires the government to report to the National Assembly the "Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations" established every five years and the "Implementation Plan" established every year (Article 14).

In addition, the National Assembly has the right to approve of "inter-Korean agreements or legislative matters that impose a significant financial burden on the state or the people" (Article 21). Likewise, if the President seeks to suspend an inter-Korean agreement approved by the National Assembly, he is required to re-obtain the consent of the National Assembly (Article 23).

First of all, the requirement to report the ‘Basic Plan’ and ‘Implementation Plan’ before the National Assembly only requires reporting the content of those plans with no option for the Assembly to force amendment or addition. As such, it is difficult to say that the National Assembly has any particular ‘authority’ in the matter.

More importantly, if the government wants to stop the inter-Korean agreement agreed by the National Assembly, it must obtain the National Assembly's consent again. To date, the National Assembly has agreed to a total of 13 inter-Korean agreements, including four agreements related to inter-Korean economic cooperation.

However, with most of the inter-Korean agreements previously approved by the National Assembly suspended due to the "May 24 Measures" in 2010, the National Assembly failed to properly exercise its right to agree to suspend agreements, as stipulated in Article 23. The lack of clarity around Article 23 could pose a problem, Nevertheless, this behavior corresponds to the National Assembly's ‘abandonment of authority.’

 

The National Assembly must find its own role in inter-Korean relations

The division of the peninsula has put the two Koreas in a state of confrontation. Due to the special situation on the Korean Peninsula, it is inevitable that the government will have a certain degree of authority over inter-Korean relations and dialogue.

However, the government's current monopoly on negotiations with North Korea is not desirable for the development of inter-Korean relations. In order to resume inter-Korean relations at a time when dialogues between North and South Korean authorities' dialogue has been suspended and trust has been undermined, a diverse range of actors must be able to engage in dialogue with North Korea.

The National Assembly is a constitutional institution that represents the people. As such, it must share with the government the constitutional responsibility for Korean unification. In other words, the National Assembly's abandonment of its authority and role in inter-Korean relations is tantamount to abandoning its constitutional obligations. The National Assembly must use its powers as a legislature to actively participate in inter-Korean relations.

Additionally, the opposition party’s role and responsibility in inter-Korean relations needs to be emphasized. North Korea policies and inter-Korean agreements made without consideration for the opposition's voice are bound to be short-lived. We have witnessed countless times the way South Korea's regime change undermines and suspends inter-Korean relations.

It is said that “a crisis is an opportunity.” In the face of bleak inter-Korean relations, I hope that our government and National Assembly can work together to find a framework for the development of stable inter-Korean relations.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article is a column published in OhmyNews. http://omn.kr/1zc5n