*What lesson can we learn from efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula over the past 30 years? @iStock
Il Young Jeong
Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University
This year, the North Korean nuclear problem continues to be a pressing issue not just for security on the Korean Peninsula, but for Northeast Asia and the global non-proliferation regime as well. Even though denuclearization negotiations have been suspended since the failed Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit in 2019, discussions about denuclearization policy have never stopped. Recently, however, these discussions have shifted to focus on seeking ways to balance out or deter the North through South Korean nuclear armament.
This essay is the first in a three-part series exploring the problems that have arisen over the last 30 years of efforts to denuclearize the peninsula and offers possible solutions. First, I will look for the root causes of the current vicious spiral deterring denuclearization progress on the Korean Peninsula. The second installment will point out the flaws in the current arguments in favor of South Korean nuclear possession, and the third essay will offer alternatives to a nuclear armed South Korea.
Why has instability persisted on the Korean Peninsula?
In the late 1980s, the Cold War came to a close between the Soviet Union and the United States. Given that the Korean Peninsula, alongside Germany, had long been on the forefront of the Cold War, the promise of an end to tensions made many Koreans hopeful for an era of peace. The Cold War dynamic on the Korean Peninsula had set up direct confrontation between two camps: the northern triangle of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China vs. the southern triangle of South Korea, the United States, and Japan. At the time, the Roh Tae-woo government’s effectively broke down one of these pillars of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula through Roh’s proactive northern policy and the successful establishment of diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China.
However, the warm wind coming from the post-Cold War thaw soon stopped blowing. There were some successes again in 1992 with the signing of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the other main pillars of the Cold War in East Asia – establishing US-DPRK relations and normalizing Korean relations with Japan – remained in place. North Korea became even more isolated, and in 1994 North Korea faced crippling dual crises following the sudden death of Kim Il Sung and the outbreak of widespread famine.
In the face of the complex national crisis that emerged in North Korea's politics, economy, and society in the early 1990s, many predicted that a North Korean collapse was imminent. In October 1994, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement to denuclearize North Korea and normalize US-DPRK relations. However, in the years following the agreement, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea failed to coalesce, and Japan further distanced itself from North Korea. Eventually, once North Korea overcame its national survival crisis in the mid-1990s, the regime sought ways to guarantee its own security through nuclear armament.
As the Cold War broke up, the balance of power collapsed on the Korean Peninsula. The end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States disrupted the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, leading North Korea to adopt nuclear armament as an asymmetric strategy to leverage power back in its favor. We have criticized North Korea for its nuclear armament for the last 30 years. Obviously, this criticism is more than deserved. North Korea's nuclear armament violates the international community's norms of non-proliferation and threatens South Korea in particular.
But we also cannot deny that North Korea's nuclear armament originates from the Cold War, or, more precisely, the remnants of the Cold War which have yet to be properly resolved on the Korean Peninsula. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will remain a long way off until we solve the underlying problems left over from the Cold War era. These same issues are at the root of the vicious cycle that has plagued denuclearization efforts over the past 30 years.
Why are we stuck in a vicious cycle?
Let's look back on the history of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula over the past 30 years. Why has denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula been unsuccessful? Why have the countless efforts made towards denuclearization ended up repeatedly failing and falling into a vicious cycle?
First and foremost, as I have hinted at already, the underlying cause in these failures has been the inability resolve the remaining Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula. As recently at the 1990s or even the early 2000s, North Korea has simultaneously pursued nuclear armament and improved U.S.-North Korea relations as a way to ensure the regime’s security. North Korea has long believed that only the U.S. could guarantee the regime’s security and has demanded security guarantees constantly across numerous denuclearization negotiations. Yet, the United States has been consistently lukewarm about actually improving U.S.-North Korea relations. As such, the more that North Korea-U.S. relations stayed in a stalemate, the more North Korea shifted towards relying on nuclear armament for national security.
Secondly, the international community is attempting to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons through strict sanctions. However, North Korea has shown greater resilience and resistance in the face of sanctions than was expected. The global COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020 created a situation in which international sanctions against North Korea were almost perfectly implemented, and still North Korea has continued to endure. In fact, North Korea is taking advantage of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to exercise even greater social control over its people.
In the past, the United States has successfully used strong economic sanctions to force denuclearization in Syria and Iran. However, unlike these countries, North Korea operates a closed economic system and is extremely effective at suppressing domestic resistance.
Thirdly, the past 30 years of denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula have not been effective. Negotiations in bilateral and multilateral forums failed to advance denuclearization by pursuing too high of a goal with too little mutual trust. The six-party talks ended in 2008 due to the inability to reach an agreement on the verification issue, and the Hanoi summit in 2019 likewise broke down over the dismantlement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.
Additionally, the United States and South Korea have failed to pursue a consistent denuclearization strategy on the Korean Peninsula. In contrast to North Korea's continued efforts to arm itself with nuclear weapons, denuclearization strategy from the US and South Korea has often been interrupted or altered by domestic administration changes, providing North Korea with more time and opportunities to break agreements.
Historical Lessons from the Peninsula's Struggle for Denuclearization and the Reality of North Korean Nuclear Armament
The failure to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula offers a historical lesson in and of itself. The future of the Korean Peninsula will be determined by whether we learn how to accept this hard-learned lesson. What is this lesson exactly, you ask?
First, while North Korea might engage in short-term negotiations, the North will not give up its nuclear weapons until it feels that the regime’s security is guaranteed. Only the United States can guarantee security for North Korea. It is extremely unlikely we will see a complete denuclearization of North Korea without first establishing diplomatic relations between the United State and North Korea. This means that dismantling the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula is most likely the key to North Korean denuclearization.
Secondly, the international community has failed to bring North Korea to its knees through sanctions. The regime has proven more durable than anyone expected. It is unlikely that North Korea, which has maintained a state of quasi-war against the US since the Korean War, will capitulate over sanctions any time soon. With US-China strategic competition heating up and the war in Ukraine continuing to demand the world’s attention, it is similarly unlikely that we will see additional sanctions against North Korea anytime in the near future.
Third, North Korea will take advantage of the U.S. and South Korea’s failure to put forth a consistent strategy for pursuing denuclearization. Both South Korea and the United States need to work to adopt a sustainable, consistent strategy for North Korea that both the ruling and opposition parties can agree upon. North Korea is currently entering the final stage of its nuclear armament. Time is not in our favor.
The truth is that North Korea's nuclear armament is already a reality. Rather than lamenting the past, we should look to historical lessons to find possible solutions. In both politics and academia, there have been growing arguments in favor of South Korean nuclear armament. Is nuclear armament truly an inevitable path for South Korea? I will tackle this dire question in the next column.
*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
*This article published in OhmyNews. https://omn.kr/22ixy
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