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An American Nuclear Expert’s View on Nuclear Weapons in South Korea

  

*Can nuclear weapons ensure South Korea’s safety and bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula? @iStock

 

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University


South Korea has recently been engulfed in a heated debate about South Korean nuclear armament. President Yoon Suk Yeol ignited the debate with his October 2022 report before the Ministry of Defense. The President claimed that "the problem [of North Korean nuclear armament] has become serious, and we may need deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea or develop nuclear weapons of our own." In a recent poll by Choi Jong-hyun Academy, 76.6% of South Korean citizens polled “agree” or “somewhat agree” that South Korea needs to develop its own nuclear weapons. (English language summary of the study)

So, can nuclear weapons ensure South Korea’s safety and bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula? I am inclined to say “no.” This article is the second column in the “Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Series” (previous installment) and critically reviews the assertion that South Korea needs nuclear weapons of its own to respond to North Korea's nuclear armament.

 

The Beginning of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regulations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

In order to better discuss a hypothetical nuclear-armed South Korea, we first need to understand the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) system which has formed the basis for the international community’s norms regarding nuclear non-proliferation. On July 16, 1945, the United States conducted humanity’s first successful nuclear test, codenamed “Trinity,” in the desert of New Mexico.

Less than a month after this very first nuclear test, the United States dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The explosive power in these nuclear bombs completely surpassed the destructive capabilities of any conventional weapon. Ultimately, Japan surrendered, and World War II came to an end. Following this demonstration of nuclear weapons’ catastrophic power, the major world powers each set about developing their own nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union joined the nuclear club in 1949, followed by Britain in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964.

In an anarchic world, states must look for ways to guarantee their own security or, in other words, to guarantee their survival. Nuclear weapons were the irresistible "trump card" that could seemingly guarantee a nation’s security. However, what would happen if every country chose nuclear weapons as a strategy to guarantee their own security? In short, mutual destruction.

Soon after the first nuclear weapons were brought into existence, the international community began to worry about the terrible future that might arise from unchecked nuclear proliferation. In 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was launched as way to stave off this fate. The NPT recognized the five countries that had already succeeded in nuclear armament as “nuclear states” and all other NPT members would be required to remain non-nuclear states.

How was such an "unequal" treaty possible? In theory, the NPT system was designed to limit nuclear arms possession while promoting arms reduction among the nuclear states. In turn, the non-nuclear states were guaranteed the right to pursue "peaceful use of nuclear power" with support from the nuclear-armed states. But was that really the sole motivation behind the adoption of the NPT? Perhaps the international community genuinely feared that the pursuit of survival through nuclear armament would end in global ruin.

The NPT system continues to be challenged. Since the NPT’s adoption, countries facing security crises have continuously sought out nuclear weapons as a solution. The irony of this predicament is that the cost of developing nuclear weapons is often more taxing than the original security predicament that created the desire for nuclear weapons in the first place. This non-proliferation regime that seeks to make proliferation prohibitively costly is led by none other than the United States.

So, what might happen if South Korea sets out to acquire its own nuclear weapons? Will the U.S. tolerate a nuclear-armed South Korea since South Korea is a key American ally? Moreover, would the fact that South Korea is a democratic country under nuclear duress from “axis of evil” member North Korea be enough for the international community to condone South Korean nuclear weapons?

 

The unaffordable consequences of South Korea nuclear armament

So far, the United States has been fairly touchy about suggestions of a nuclear armed South Korea. This sensitivity is a clear response in and of itself. The US has made it clear that it opposes South Korean nuclear armament and that denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula remains the end-goal.

In order to pursue nuclear weapons, South Korea would first need to first withdraw from the NPT. Would the United States, which leads the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, tolerate a South Korean bid for nuclear armament? Former head of Los Alamos National Laboratories and nuclear expert Dr. Siegfried Hecker offered a clear prediction in a 38 North article; “Should South Korea decide to build its own nuclear arsenal, I believe the United States will almost surely end its military alliance and economic partnership with Seoul. Congressional sanctions would likely follow, trade would suffer, and technology cooperation would be derailed.” Would South Korea be willing to pay this hefty price – losing the US-ROK alliance – in exchange for nuclear weapons?

If South Korea sets out to acquire nuclear weapons, it is quite likely to trigger a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia. If South Korea's nuclear armament is tolerated, Japan will also likely try to obtain its own nuclear weapons. And China? China will surely retaliate against South Korea's nuclear development with the even larger-scale economic sanctions than those they levied in response to the THAAD deployment to South Korea. In short, a nuclear South Korea would likely spark a nuclear security competition across Northeast Asia.

In reality, South Korean nuclear armament would entail tremendous resistance and pain. For a country like Korea which is highly dependent on foreign trade, leaving the NPT would more or less be a declaration that South Korea is willing to bear the economic consequences. The nuclear energy exports that the Yoon government emphasizes in its rhetoric would almost certainly also fall victim to various punitive trade regulations.

 

The nuclear button is in Washington

In this regard, some have suggested that if acquiring our own nuclear weapons is too challenging, then South Korea' should bring in American tactical nuclear weapons. However, introducing tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea would likely be looked upon as a violation of the NPT regime’s prohibitions on horizontal nuclear proliferation. Additionally, increasing US-China strategic competition makes it likely that China will be even more reactive to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula than it was to deployment of the THAAD system in the past.

But there is still an even bigger problem. Even if American tactical nuclear weapons were deployed to South Korea, the launch button would still be in Washington. The critical question remains, “Would the United States give up San Francisco for Seoul?' If the US would not be willing to endanger its own security, then tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea will not be effective.

In this case, there is no military difference for South Korean under the US nuclear umbrella between American tactical nuclear weapons being located in Guam vs. South Korea. The only difference would be nothing more than a psychological sense of security.

 

Can nuclear weapons bring us peace?

Nuclear weapons are generally thought to deter enemy aggression by virtue of their destructive power. If both hostile sides have nuclear weapons, they can achieve a "balance of fear," which could prevent war. This logic is frequently referenced in international political discussions of how peace can be accomplished through nuclear armament.

Let’s pause and take a moment to truly imagine a situation in which South Korea eventually succeeds in arming itself with nuclear weapons. Now, both the North and South have nuclear weapons. Does this hypothetical Korean Peninsula seem likely to be a peaceful one? Probably not. Why is that?

The reason we don’t have peace currently is not because we don’t have nuclear weapons. The reason we are not at peace is because the peninsula is divided, the war has not ended, and the North and South are unable to trust each other.

Even if the two Koreas achieve a ‘balance of fear’ through nuclear weapons, our situation will only grow more unstable so long as the two Koreas fail to dismantle the armistice system and develop mutual trust. With the current divided state of the Korean Peninsula, mutual nuclear armament is likely to bring about nuclear confrontation and politicization, not balance.

As for the aforementioned poll on South Korea's nuclear armament, do these kinds of surveys pose genuine questions about our reality and our future? The result might have been very different if the survey had asked, "Would you support nuclear armament even if you would have to give up the US-ROK alliance?"

If South Korean nuclear armament isn’t a feasible solution, then what alternatives do we have for peace on the Korean Peninsula? If not nuclear weapons, what do we need to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula? In the third installment, we will explore some options.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article published in OhmyNews. https://omn.kr/22nr9

 

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