Il Young Jeong
Senior Research Fellow_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University
With the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration in South Korea, the Ministry of Unification has been rebuilt. One of the most notable aspects of the recent organizational restructuring of the Ministry is the large-scale introduction of social dialogue mechanisms and public–private cooperation bodies. This article seeks to propose key considerations that should be addressed in Social Dialogue 2.0 on the Korean Peninsula being pursued by the South Korean government and civil society.
The Rise of Social Dialogue
During the 22nd presidential election, President Lee Jae-myung pledged to promote the “activation of social dialogue” on North Korea and unification policy. Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young has also emphasized a “people-sovereign North Korea policy,” stating that citizens—the sovereign power holders—should be able to participate more actively and express their opinions on inter-Korean relations and unification issues.
In August 2025, the Presidential Committee on State Affairs Planning presented “Promoting Peace and Unification Policies on the Korean Peninsula Together with the People” as National Task No. 117. It announced plans to “establish and operate a social dialogue framework that expands and institutionalizes direct public participation in North Korea and unification policy.” According to the plan, social dialogue bodies will be open to all citizens, composed through collaboration among the government, the National Assembly, and civil society, and will pursue dialogue on a wide range of agendas using diverse methods.
In this regard, the Ministry of Unification established systems for social dialogue and public–private cooperation through an organizational restructuring last October. Under the direct authority of the Minister, a new “Korean Peninsula Policy Listening Group” was created, incorporating a Social Dialogue Team and a Civil Participation Team.
In addition, within the Office of Unification Policy, the Ministry established a Civil Society Communication Division and a Civil Society Cooperation Division. The Korea Institute for National Unification Education was reorganized into the National Institute for Peace, Unification, and Democratic Citizenship Education, with plans to promote a Korean version of the Beutelsbach Consensus (K-Beutelsbach Consensus) for peace, unification, and democratic citizenship education through social dialogue.
Given that Yoon Suk-yeol and insurrectionary forces attempted to justify insurrection by exploiting the weak links of the division system, and that this process involved the government’s monopoly over policymaking, there can be little disagreement about pursuing a people-sovereign North Korea policy and institutionalizing social dialogue in that process. However, discussions must continue on what kind of social dialogue should be pursued.
Achievements and Limitations of Social Dialogue 1.0
During the Moon Jae-in administration, a civil society–led process of social dialogue was carried out to draft a proposed National Unification Agreement. At the time, conservative, progressive, and centrist civil society organizations, together with representatives of the seven major religions, came together to form the National Citizens’ Assembly for Social Dialogue on the Vision of Peace and Unification.
The National Citizens’ Assembly defined social dialogue for peace and unification as “a deliberative democracy initiative that enables citizens, as the principal stakeholders, to directly participate in deliberation and engage in policymaking on issues of peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea policy.”
Beginning with the formation of the Citizens’ Promotion Committee for the Unification Agreement in July 2018, and continuing until the delivery of the proposed National Unification Agreement to the Minister of Unification in July 2021, a total of 30 rounds of social dialogue were held, involving approximately 3,400 participants. Based on these discussions, and following deliberative debates by a final Citizens’ Participatory Group of 109 members, the proposed National Unification Agreement was produced.
At a time when inter-Korean policy–related divisions within South Korean society (so-called “South–South conflict”) were emerging as a serious social issue, the effort achieved significant results by formulating a proposed National Unification Agreement through social dialogue. However, limitations remained: the selection of agendas was inevitably constrained, and the outcomes of the social dialogue were not translated into concrete policies, leaving room for regret.
Social Dialogue 2.0: Embracing Practicality and Future Values
What, then, should Social Dialogue 2.0 look like? First, Social Dialogue 1.0 was organized around representative civil society organizations (and coalitions) from conservative, progressive, centrist, and religious groups, with the aim of easing ideological divisions within South Korean society. Dialogue among conservatives, progressives, and centrists must continue. However, if such categorizations are applied uniformly across all sectors, they may limit the practicality and scalability of social dialogue.
For example, as the government restructures unification education into peace, unification, and democratic citizenship education, there is a need for practical consultations that expand the participation of on-the-ground actors—namely teachers and students—while bringing together experts and policymakers in joint discussions.
Second, whereas Social Dialogue 1.0 had the clear objective of producing a “proposed National Unification Agreement,” the currently promoted Social Dialogue 2.0 requires a newly constructed set of discussion topics (agendas) led by civil society. In this regard, it is essential not only to address the immediate issues facing the Korean Peninsula, but also to actively identify future-oriented agendas and seek alternatives. In this process, the role of future generations should be given particular emphasis.
Third, Social Dialogue 2.0 must move beyond “dialogue for the sake of dialogue” and be translated into concrete policies. To this end, institutional mechanisms should be developed in parallel to ensure that the outcomes of social dialogue are implemented as government policy and carried forward into legislative action by the National Assembly. Relevant provisions could be incorporated into the government’s proposed enactment of a (tentatively titled) Framework Act on Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula.
Additionally, it is important to avoid the pitfall of attempting to pursue all policies solely through social dialogue. If, amid the current enthusiasm for social dialogue, every issue were to be funneled into such processes, the result could be extreme inefficiency. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s pledges on North Korea and unification policy must be implemented through their own appropriate democratic procedures.
*IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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