Skip to main content

I Oppose the Revision of Japan's Security Strategy that Undermines the Peace Constitution


*The Rising Sun Flag flying above a Japanese warship. @iStock

 

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University


On December 16th, 2022, the Kishida Cabinet revised Japan’s national security strategy and effectively neutralized Japan’s long-standing ‘defense-only’ policy to act only in response to an attack by an enemy, a principle that has been maintained since World War II.

Rather than revising Japan’s Peace Constitution, the Japanese government played a trick. Yet, the Korean government’s response to this maneuver has been vague at best. This article investigates and criticizes the Korean government's lukewarm response to Japan’s tricky switch away from its defense-only policy.

 

How Revising Three Security Documents Rocked the Foundation of Japan's Peace Constitution?

On December 16, the Japanese government called an extraordinary cabinet meeting during which it revised and approved three major security documents, including a document regarding the country’s "second-strike capability" to attack enemy missile bases and others strategic targets. 

These three security documents revised during the session were the “National Security Strategy (NSS),” the “National Defense Strategy (NDS),” and the “Defense Buildup Program”. These are key documents that stipulate Japan's basic diplomatic security guidelines, the role of the Self-Defense Forces and plans for developing its defense capabilities, as well as the procurement of defense equipment.

The key revision to these three security documents was the specification that “should it be confirmed that an enemy has commenced an attack against Japan” that Japan will proactively “use its abilities to strike enemy installations” (conduct a counterstrike). However, the language is vague at to what criteria will be used to judge that an opponent has ‘commenced an attack’. Depending on the criteria for this judgment, the ‘defense-only’ principle of the Peace Constitution may be nullified.

Japan's Peace Constitution denies Japan both the intent and necessary capacity to carry out military attacks. Article 9 of the Peace Constitution stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” More specifically, to achieve this purpose, Japan will not sustain "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” and “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Former Japanese Prime Minister Abe was well known for his constant efforts to revise Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. Seeing that revising the Peace Constitution would face serious opposition at home and abroad, the Kishida Cabinet devised a trick to instead revising the three major security documents. The Kishida Cabinet also rapidly implemented follow-up measures to the revisions. The cabinet increased the 2023 defense budget as much as 25 percent from the previous year (raised to 6.8 trillion yen), including funding for "counterattack capability".

 

Does the Yoon Suk-Yeol Government Support Japan's Neutralization of the Peace Constitution?

Figures in the Japanese government has consistently made attempts to nullify the ‘defense-only’ policy of Japan’s national security policy since the rise of the Abe Cabinet. With no acknowledgement or reflection on Japan’s colonial history from the Japanese government, Korea which directly experienced Japanese colonial rule can never forgive or allow attempts undermine Japan’s ‘defense-only’ principle.

Contrary to the sentiment of the South Korean people, the Yoon administration is devoted to pursuing military cooperation between Korea and Japan. However, the Korean people's perception of military cooperation is very negative at a time when the history issue between Korea and Japan has not been resolved and Japan has yet to acknowledge or reflect on its colonial past. 

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in November 2022, the South Korean Navy participated in the international naval fleet review. When polled about the ceremony, 60.7% of Koreans felt that it was "inappropriate" for the Korean Navy to salute the Rising Sun Flag [a flag closely associated with Imperial Japan]” (Media Tomato, 60th Regular Opinion Poll).

Regarding the revision of Japan's security strategy, the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration is defending Japan's position, saying that the changes do not alter the underlying concept of the Peace Constitution because Japan would only exercise its "counterattack capability" within strict parameters and conditions. In addition, the Yoon administration emphasized that "close advance consultation and agreement with South Korea will be essential on issues that have a significant impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula and our national interests." However, this is only the wish of the Korean government, and Japan does not necessarily share this belief.

 

Can Korea control Japan's 'preemptive counterattack'?

We also need to pay close attention to the US and China's response to Japan's new security strategy. The United States welcomed Japan's new strategy as “reshap[ing] the ability of our alliance to promote peace and protect the rules-based world order, not just in the Indo-Pacific but around the world as well” (Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy Spokesperson). On the other hand, China dispatched Liaoning ships and others off Okinawa to stage an armed protest of the change. The United States is trying to rebuild Japan as a base for its containment efforts against China and North Korea.

In the short-term, Japan's "preemptive counterattack" policy can be understood as a response to North Korea's repeated missile launches. In the longer term, however, the policy’s scope seems to be directed at China. In which case, can the Korean government control Japan's 'preemptive counterattack'? Given Japan's current position, it seems difficult unlikely that the South Korean government would be able to control a Japanese preemptive counterattack against North Korea.

Recently, a Japanese defense ministry official shocked many when he told foreign media at a press briefing that Japan's preemptive counterattack "exercises Japan's right to self-defense and Japan does not need permission from other countries [to exercise this right]” and will "judge [when to exercise this right] on its own". In other words, Japan will also independently judge the appropriateness of a "preemptive counterattack" against North Korea, despite the fact that the South Korean constitution includes North Korea as part of our national territory. Now, Japan has emerged as a variable that further increases the possibility of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

 

Korea Should Say “No” to the Japanese Government

South Korea is a key party in the Korean Peninsula issue. The Yoon Suk-Yeol government should clearly express its opposition to Japan's revision of its security strategy. Above all, the danger that a Japanese "preemptive counterattack" targeting the Korean Peninsula, especially North Korea, could turn into another war makes its an unforgivable policy choice.

Unsurprisingly, on December 20th, 2022, North Korea condemned the change in a statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman that "rapacious Japan is rebuilding its ability to re-invade [the Korean Peninsula] under the guise of the right to self-defense, and this action can never be justified and unacceptable." The spokesperson also threatened, "[North Korea] will continue to openly take practical action in response to Japan’s inappropriate and overambitions designs". In short, another line for potential armed conflict is being drawn on the Korean Peninsula.

In conclusion, Japan's military actions, or at the very least its actions on the Korean Peninsula, need to be controlled within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance's security on the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise, the Korean Peninsula could be pulled into a whirlpool of armed conflict between North Korea and Japan. In this regard, the Korean government should clearly convey our opposition to the new security policy to the US government as well.

I am deeply worried by Korea and Japan’s recent posture of trying to resolve pending issues exclusively between governments and to the exclusion of civil society. On the history issue in particular, the Yoon administration is ignoring the public opinion that the history issues between our countries must be resolved completely. The Kishida Cabinet has likewise ignored the opinion of the Japanese public who support the Peace Constitution.

 

Recently, the guarantee of democratic decision-making related the Korean Peninsula issue has been violated in all concerned countries. To rectify this exclusion, civil society in both Korea and Japan need to actively seek alternatives and respond to issues together.

 

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

*This article is a column published in OhmyNews. http://omn.kr/221tr

Comments

Best click

Korean Drama: A Korean Perspective on Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Unification

   Korean Drama :  A Korean Perspective on Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Unification     Il Young Jeong & Rose Adams Amazon Kindle Edition  ‏: ‎January 23, 2024 ISBN: 9798218366841 Korea is known for its drama, whether it's the theatrics of North Korea's provocations or our beloved dramas and K-pop, Korea has risen on the world stage and captivated the attention of millions around the globe. Whether you come from a security background or want to know why regional tensions are so high the even BTS couldn’t avoid military service, this book aims to familiarize readers with a South Korean perspective on inter-Korean affairs, untangle recent events on the Peninsula, and discuss what "supporting role" the US might play in this world-class Korean drama. Just like Korea’s famous movies and TV shows, there is no shortage of drama on the Korean Peninsula. Unlike these shows, however, the ending remains unclear. This book endeavors to explain the plot so far and look f

The 1994 Agreed Framework (Geneva Agreement)

The 1994 Agreed Framework came towards the end of North Korea’s nuclear development and is often considered the United States’ last chance to halt the North’s nuclear program. In exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons program and submit to IAEA inspections, the US agreed to help North Korea resolve the “energy problems” ostensibly driving the North’s pursuit of nuclear energy, first by providing oil and later by constructing tamper-proof nuclear reactors. While the North did temporarily freeze plutonium production and the construction of two new reactors, both sides soon fell through on the deal. While it is difficult to know if North Korea ever truly ceased its operations, it did begin secretly enriching uranium shortly after the agreement and was caught out by intelligence officials under the Bush administration, which opted to void the agreement altogether rather than try to negotiate to save the deal.

Unification Attitude Surveys

The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University and the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) both conduct regular surveys on attitudes towards unification. To the best of my knowledge, these reports are only available in Korean. 2022 Surveys:  Seoul University      KINU