*Why the U.S. strategy for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has failed over the past 30 years? ⓒiStock
Il Young Jeong
Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University
It has been 30 years since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) special inspection in 1992 that first raised suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development. Efforts have been made to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula over the past 30 years, but ultimately we have failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. This article attempts to analyze why the U.S. strategy for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has failed over the past 30 years.
The United States has failed to normalize US-DPRK relations
Despite the end of the Cold War, one of the reasons why the Korean Peninsula remains stuck in Cold War is that we have yet to successfully normalize relations between North Korea and the United States. North Korea has constantly provoked and denounced the United States with violent language. While some might argue that the North’s provocations simply demonstrate North Korea's barbarism, the North’s harsh behavior is actually something more akin to courting the U.S.
How did North Korea, which was isolated after the end of the Cold War, try to ensure the security of the regime? North Korea stood at a crossroads. One path was to have the regime’s security guaranteed by the United States, and the other was to develop nuclear weapons.
Some argue that North Korea has its security guaranteed by China, but North Korea has long understood that ultimately only the US could guarantee the regime’s safety. While the US grew tired of North Korea’s repeated provocations, the North continued to seek out new ways to somehow attract attention from the US.
Consequently, North Korea has constantly demanded normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations, beginning with the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Joint Communique, the 2000 US-DPRK Joint Communique, and at the six-party talks in the September 19th Joint Statement (2005) and the February 13th Agreement (2007).
However, the U.S. has never taken concrete steps to normalize relations with North Korea. In 2000, at the end of the Clinton administration, North First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jo Myong-rok and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with each other, marking the closest the US has come to a step towards normalizing relations. However, even these efforts did not lead to substantive action.
Did the US not know that if normalizing relations proved impossible then the North would pursue nuclear weapons for self-defense? With normalizing US-DRPK relations such an important facet of creating peace on the Peninsula, the least the US should have done was implement some low-level policy measures to pursue normalization. The US did not fail to normalize relations with North Korea; it wasn’t interested in normalization. And, as a result, North Korea chose nuclear weapons.
America's 'strategic patience' was the worst strategy
The Obama administration, which appeared in 2009, was facing a decisive phase in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test and advanced its domestic nuclear program. Two years later in December of 2008, even the six-party talks were suspended due to differences in opinion over the verification and investigation of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. At a time when concrete vision and actions was badly needed, the Obama administration put forth its opaque policy of "strategic patience." This was a somewhat fanciful strategy in which the administration believed it could cause change in North Korea by exerting passive pressure and refusing to engage in dialogue.
This elusive U.S. strategy provided time and space for the Kim Jong-un regime, which emerged in 2011, to eventually declare its possession of nuclear weapons through its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Since 2016, the UN Security Council has pressured North Korea with incredibly strong sanctions, but ultimately failed to prevent North Korea’s nuclear armament.
What did the Obama administration's "strategic patience" contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? Unfortunately, "strategic patience" will be remembered as a time of listless inaction. "Strategic patience" has been the United States’ absolute worst choice in its strategy to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
At this point, sanctions against North Korea have failed
When North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in 2016, the U.N. Security Council imposed ‘unprecedentedly’ strong sanctions against the North. In particular, the UN’s response to North Korea’s ICBM launching in 2017 (UNSC Resolution No. 2397) became a central piece of the sanctions regime.
The U.N. Security Council's resolution on sanctions against North Korea was a measure to completely control North Korea's exports and imports, block the dispatch of workers overseas, and block finance and investment. On top of that, independent sanctions against North Korea led by the U.S. Treasury Department have leveraged the power of the US Dollar to lead banks around the world to participate in a ‘secondary boycott’ and voluntarily block all financial transactions with North Korea.
South Korea, as well as China and Russia, participated in the UN-orchestrated sanctions against North Korea, lending serious power to the sanctions regime. Moreover, when the COVID-19 outbreak began in early 2020, the effectiveness of the sanctions effectively doubled as North Korea sealed off its own borders in response to the pandemic.
As such, North Korea seemed unlikely to be able to withstand international sanctions. South Korea and China’s participation in the sanction’s regime blocked the North’s only exit and seemed likely lead to the North’s eventual surrender. Yet, North Korea has endured this pressure for five years now. Hope has since been shattered that North Korea would surrender if its external supply was cut off. As for the reason North Korea has been able to withstand sanctions, I invite you to refer to my previous column(Crisis Doesn’t Mean Collapse)
Recently, even the international community's strong sanctions alliance against North Korea has begun to falter. The U.N. Security Council discussed additional sanctions against North Korea after three more ICBM tests in 2022, but China and Russia exercised their vetoes and opposed any further sanctions. Even if North Korea conducts its seventh nuclear test, it looks unlikely that the previous sanctions regime will be restored.
The United States has to engage in dialogue for the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula is clearly facing a crisis unlike any it has faced before. There are several interlocking problems we need to untangle to change the current state of affairs. Where do we start, and what do we need do?
First, the United States needs to take responsibility and engage in dialogue on the peninsula. Cooperation between the United States and China is essential to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Although the U.S.-China strategic competition is intensifying, the U.S. also acknowledges the need for cooperation with China on the Korean Peninsula. As a responsible party in working for peace on the peninsula, the US needs to engage in dialogue with China.
Second, the US should engage in negotiations with North Korea. The United States continues to emphasize that it is willing to talk with North Korea with no conditions. However, the trust between North Korea and the United States is already broken. The US should present concrete measures designed to improve relations with North Korea. What might have happened in 1993, 2000, or even in 2018 if the US had taken meaningful steps towards normalizing US-DPRK relations. We cannot turn back time, but the US must freeze the current escalating situation before it can face a North Korea now capable of threatening the US mainland.
Third, what is the purpose of sanctions against North Korea? It bears remembering that sanctions are meant as a tool for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. However, the current sanctions on North Korea are hindering the effective operation of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this situation, “Snapback” style conditional sanctions relief should be implemented as an incentive for North Korean denuclearization measures.
The U.S. is no longer safe from North Korea's nuclear weapons
At present, the United States’ denuclearization strategy in North Korea has failed. Moreover, North Korea’s recent provocations are aimed at the US. As North Korea has said before, they have chosen to protect themselves through nuclear weapons rather than an agreement with the US.
North Korea's armed provocations in recent weeks are no longer for the sake of negotiating with the U.S. or for domestic political purposes. North Korea will soon try to miniaturize its nuclear weapons and expand the range of intercontinental ballistic missiles to demonstrate that their weapons pose a direct threat to the United States.
Now, even the United States is no longer safe from North Korea's nuclear weapons. Any further "strategic patience" or risky security competition must be stopped. North Korea's armed provocation on the Korean Peninsula and the escalating responses from the US-ROK alliance could potentially lead to a local armed conflict. This is not the Korean strategy that the US wants.
The goal of sanctions against North Korea is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. What will the United States do for peace on the Korean Peninsula? The U.S. government should first dispassionately re-evaluate its choices in denuclearization strategy over the past 30 years and go forward pursuing peace on the peninsula in a responsible manner. With the right to participate in negotiations comes the responsibility to make an earnest effort for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
*This article is a column published in OhmyNews. http://omn.kr/21l46
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