*The United Nations members who participated in the Korean War are standing. @iStock
Il Young Jeong
Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University
The Korean War did not end, but rather ‘concluded’ with a mutual cessation of hostilities. Under the armistice agreement, the Cold War endured on the peninsula with the trilateral alliance between the US, South Korea, and Japan on one side and the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral alliance on the other. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union may have ended the Cold War in Europe, the Cold War persisted on the peninsula.
In this chapter, we will look at how South Korea’s policies regarding North Korea have evolved since the end of the Korean War and how the US-ROK alliance has responded to the problems that have arisen in pursuit of these policies.
South Korea’s “Nordpolitik” Policy and the End of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union
As the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union began to thaw in the 1980s, the Roh Tae Woo administration in South Korea began pursuing new, proactive policies to engage North Korea and the socialist bloc. This North-facing policy, also known as “Nordpolitik,” culminated in the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the successful establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union, China, and socialist nations of Eastern Europe.
Despite South Korea’s success in establishing relations with the ‘other side,’ North Korea was unable to establish diplomatic relations with the United States or Japan and ended up further isolated following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. With the North’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons development, the Korean Peninsula alone remained stuck in time as the last remaining “island” of the Cold War.
In retrospect, the Roh administration’s north-facing policies were likely the best chance for dismantling the Cold War structure on the peninsula and moving towards peace. Even after multiple changes in administration, the 1991 “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement” in particular has continued to act as the backbone of inter-Korean relations.
The text of the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement” states that “the relationship between the two Koreas is not that of between two countries, but rather a special relationship that has been formed provisionally as part of the process of unification.” In other words, the relationship between North and South is special and goes beyond simple state-to-state relations, and this special status is an essential element of the foundation of inter-Korean relations. (For more on this “special relationship” and inter-Korean agreements, refer to Ch. 16 and 17.)
The Basic Agreement also included provisions for reconciliation and non-aggression between the two Koreas, as well as mutual exchange and cooperation. To this end, the Agreement proposed the formation of various committees, including the Inter-Korean Reconciliation Committee, the Inter-Korean Military Committee, and the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Committee. In other words, inter-Korean affairs can be viewed as the process of working to realize the vision and promises of the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. North Korea’s nuclear development is the single greatest obstacle to this process.
Sticks vs. Carrots: Responding to North Korea’s Nuclear Development
The converging collapse of the Soviet Union and the normalization of relations between China and South Korea in the 90s left North Korea more isolated than before. While North Korea may have wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the United States or Japan, this never materialized. Instead, the power dynamic on the peninsula began tipping out of the North’s favor. It is no coincidence that this change in dynamics coincides with the beginning of North Korea’s push to pursue nuclear weapons and restore the previous power balance.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development is the single greatest threat to peace on the peninsula. The South Korean government has reacted to the North’s nuclear development and testing with a mix of carrots and sticks. The promise of North-South economic cooperation served as a “carrot,” while the threat of increased economic sanctions acted as a “stick.” Simplistic as it may seem, this approach did result in some gradual progress towards preventing physical conflict between the two Koreas.
On the “carrot” side of the equation, South Korean progressives have come to see inter-Korean economic cooperation as a key task in stabilizing North-South relations following the first inter-Korean summit in 2002. This economic engagement strategy is supported by a pragmatic approach that sees economic cooperation as a mutually beneficial way to foster mutual dependence. This approach has been concretely tested in the form of a special economic zone in the city of Kaesong and in promotion of North Korea’s Mt. Kumkang to South Korean tourists.
As for “sticks,” South Korean conservatives' hard line policies are founded in a belief that you cannot trust North Korea, especially in denuclearization negotiations. Following North Korea’s sixth successful nuclear test in 2017, the US-led UN Security Council enacted unprecedentedly stringent sanctions against North Korea, and these sanctions remain in effect today. When the pro-engagement Moon Jae In administration managed to engage North Korean in dialogue twice through two inter-Korean summits in 2018, rolling back these sanctions was a critical bargaining chip in denuclearization discussions.
Together, these two elements have largely worked to avoid material conflict between the two sides. The “Pyongyang Agreement” released following the September 2018 inter-Korean summit stated that, “the two Koreas agreed to end hostility at fortified regions, including the Demilitarized Zone, and continue such momentum by seeking to remove all real risks of war on the Korean Peninsula and resolve hostile relations.” However, ever since the failure of the 2019 Hanoi US-DPRK summit, North Korea appears to have abandoned this promise and has resumed ICBM testing and other military provocations.
Changes on the Peninsula and the Future of the US-ROK Alliance
Following the armistice agreement in 1953, the US and South Korea adopted a mutual defense treaty and have since worked in tandem to handle problems on the peninsula. The US-ROK alliance has since been a constant in managing security on the Korean Peninsula.
The “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea” adopted in October 1953 included the following agreements:
ARTICLE I
“The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.”
ARTICLE II
“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.”
ARTICLE IV
“The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose of United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.”
In this way, the US-ROK alliance, in conjunction with the Korean War armistice agreement, has served as the key mechanism for guaranteeing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, as the relationship between North and South Korea has evolved, many have suggested that the US-ROK alliance must look to change and adapt as well. Going forward, how can we expect the US-ROK alliance to evolve and transform?
The US-ROK alliance is still recognized as a necessary constant for security on the Korean Peninsula. However, in order for the Korean Peninsula to transition from an armistice system to a peace system, the US-ROK alliance will need to evolve in new ways. While there are various opinions on how exactly the alliance should change, the UN and the US-ROK alliance will need to continue to play the role of peacekeepers until peace on the Korean Peninsula and security in Northeast Asia are institutionalized in a sustainable manner.
*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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