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There Will Be No Korean Reunification Without Preparation


Vehicles are waiting at a checkpoint to pass through the Civilian Control Zone in the inter-Korean border area. © Il Young Jeong


Il Young Jeong

Senior Research Fellow_Institute of Social Science_Sogang University


Autumn is not only the season of harvest but also a time to prepare for the year ahead. Governments, too, are particularly busy during this period. The regular session of the National Assembly, which opened on September 1, is now preparing for parliamentary audits of government agencies and deliberations on next year’s budget. The government has submitted a proposed budget of 820.9 trillion won for 2027 to the National Assembly. Amid an unprecedented semiconductor boom and rising tax revenues, the government has been seen as taking a proactive approach to fiscal policy, including the establishment of a 160 trillion won fund for responding to future challenges.

Against this backdrop, how has the Ministry of Unification’s budget been allocated? This column examines the 2027 budget for inter-Korean affairs and proposes making more active use of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund in response to changes in inter-Korean relations.

 

How Was the Ministry of Unification’s 2027 Budget Allocated?

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea declares in its preamble that the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a national mission. It also stipulates that the president “shall have the duty to pursue the peaceful reunification of the homeland” (Article 66). Reunification may still seem like a distant prospect. But if inter-Korean tensions persist and the differences between the two Koreas continue to widen, the resulting burden will inevitably be passed on to future generations and to the Korean people as a whole. Reunification is therefore more than a constitutional obligation. It is an investment in our futureand, for that very reason, a profound national responsibility.

Yet the budget allocated to preparing for reunification and normalizing inter-Korean relations remains extremely limited. The 2027 budget proposal for the Ministry of Unification submitted by the government to the National Assembly amounts to 1.2549 trillion won, representing just 0.153 percent of the total national budget of 820 trillion won. Of this amount, only 243.4 billion won comes from the general account. Nearly half of the general-account budget is allocated to supporting the settlement of North Korean defectors, with 77.5 billion won earmarked for that purpose.

More specifically, the Ministry of Unification’s general-account budget is allocated as follows: 77.5 billion won (44.4 percent) for support for the settlement of North Korean defectors; 26.2 billion won (14.9 percent) for analysis of developments in North Korea; 25.3 billion won (14.5 percent) for education on peaceful reunification; 15.1 billion won (8.6 percent) for unification policy; 12.7 billion won (7.3 percent) for building the foundations for inter-Korean relations; and 4.8 billion won (2.8 percent) for resolving humanitarian issues.

Even the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, which accounts for the vast majority of the Ministry of Unification’s overall budget and amounts to 1.0115 trillion won, has historically recorded an execution rate of only around 2 to 3 percent. In reality, therefore, the amount of government funding actually devoted to preparing for improved inter-Korean relations and eventual reunification is extremely small.

We often speak of the “peaceful reunification” mandated by the Constitution. Yet in practice, we are failing to invest in reunification. Why?

 

The Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Must Adapt to Changing Inter-Korean Relations

Inter-Korean relations have recently reached a deep freeze. There has been no dialogue between the authorities, let alone meaningful humanitarian cooperation. But should we simply do nothing because relations between the two Koreas are difficult? Certainly not. The more challenging inter-Korean relations become, the more important long-term and sustained investment is. Above all, we need to adjust the purpose and use of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to reflect changes in inter-Korean relations, improve its execution rate, and prepare for the future.

Under the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act, the fund is intended primarily to support exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. Its uses include: (1) travel between the two Koreas by residents of the North and South; (2) cooperation projects in areas such as the environment, culture, sports, tourism, public health and medical care, and disease prevention; (3) trade and economic cooperation projects; and (4) other projects designed to promote inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation that contribute to building trust between the two Koreas and restoring the Korean national community.

At the same time, public perceptions of reunification in South Korea have been deteriorating. The traditional argument that the two Koreas must reunify simply because they are one Korean nation is gradually losing its influence. If that is the case, what should we do?

In response, the Ministry of Unification plans to use the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to support projects in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and border regions, as well as initiatives related to Peace Economy Special Zones. It also plans to use the fund to rebuild the research ecosystem for North Korean studies and unification studies, which has been weakened by prolonged confrontation and hostility, and to revitalize civic movements for reunification. To provide a legal basis for these expenditures, the ministry plans to revise the Enforcement Decree of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act.

However, the Ministry of Planning and Budget, headed by Minister Park Hong-keun, is reportedly taking a negative view of the Ministry of Unification’s plan for operating the fund. This is deeply regrettable.

 

A Government That Is Not Preparing for Reunification

We live on the Korean Peninsula. We can achieve peace and prosperity by making the most of the advantages of our geographic position as a peninsula connecting the continent and the sea. After all, is not the Republic of Korea a country whose economy depends heavily on exports? Yet with inter-Korean relations severed, we have long since lost our overland route to the continent. Reunification is not simply about bringing one nation together; it is about shaping the future of the Republic of Korea.

Transforming the border areas and the Demilitarized Zone into zones of peace, and supporting the rebuilding of the weakened fields of North Korean studies and unification studies, are not short-term projects. They are long-term investments in preparing for future reunification and cultivating experts in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. If the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund cannot be used for such purposes, then what, exactly, is the fund supposed to support? Does the Lee Jae Myung administration have no intention of preparing for reunification?

As noted above, the government has set aside 160 trillion won for a Future Response Fund in its proposed budget for the coming year. Looking at the shrinking budget of the Ministry of Unification and the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund that remains largely unused, it is difficult not to feel a profound sense of concern over whether we are truly preparing for reunification.

In its deliberations on the government’s budget proposal, the National Assembly should carefully examine whether the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund can be properly used to prepare for reunification. The Ministry of Planning and Budget, too, should seek an appropriate way to manage the fund in light of the profound responsibility for reunification set forth in our Constitution.

Reunification will not come without preparation.

 


 *IL-Young Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. 

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